



Puolustusministeriö  
Försvarsministeriet  
Ministry of Defence

# Government Defence Report

Publications of the Ministry of Defence 2024:7



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# Government Defence Report

Ministry of Defence Helsinki 2024

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Abstract

The Government Defence Report reviews the operating environment of defence and evaluates the development needs of defence. It defines the defence policy guidelines for the sustainment and development of Finland's defence capability as part of NATO.

The Government Defence Report is a continuation of the previous Government Defence Report (Publications of the Finnish Government 2021:80). Its preparation was guided by the analysis of the operating environment presented in the Government report on Finnish foreign and security policy (Publications of the Finnish Government 2024:35). The Government Defence Report was prepared in cross-government cooperation and drafted in consultation with the parliamentary monitoring group.

The Government Defence Report and its implementation will safeguard Finland's defence capability in a difficult and unpredictable operating environment, enable the sustainment and development of a defence system with a multi-domain operations capability, outline the necessary human and economic resources and guide the development of national legislation. The report takes full account of the effects of Finland's membership in NATO and lays the foundations for Finland's defence policy and military role in NATO, the EU and international defence cooperation.

The Government Defence Report spans over the current electoral term into the 2030s.

**Keywords** defence policy, homeland defence, defence system, NATO, defence cooperation, reports (statements)

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## Valtioneuvoston puolustusselonteko

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### Tiivistelmä

Valtioneuvoston puolustusselonteossa tarkastellaan puolustuksen toimintaympäristöä ja arvioidaan puolustuksen kehittämistarpeita. Selonteko määrittää puolustuspoliittiset linjaukset Suomen puolustuskyvyn ylläpidolle ja kehittämiselle osana Natoa.

Tämä puolustusselonteko on jatkoa valtioneuvoston edelliselle puolustusselonteolle (VN julkaisu 2021:78), ja sen valmistelua on ohjannut valtioneuvoston ulko- ja turvallisuuspoliittisen selonteon (VN julkaisu 2024:33) toimintaympäristön analyysi. Puolustusselonteko on valmisteltu poikkihallinnollisessa yhteistyössä ja sen laatimisessa on kuultu parlamentaarista seurantaryhmää.

Puolustusselonteolla ja sen toimeenpanolla turvataan Suomen puolustuskky vakavassa ja vaikeasti ennakoitavassa toimintaympäristössä, luodaan edellytykset kaikki operatiiviset toimintaympäristöt huomioivan puolustusjärjestelmän ylläpidolle ja kehittämiselle, linjataan henkilöstötarpeesta ja taloudellisista voimavaroista sekä ohjataan kansallisen lainsäädännön kehittämistä. Selonteossa on otettu kattavasti huomioon Nato-jäsenyyden vaikutukset ja siinä annetaan perusteet Suomen puolustuspoliittiselle ja sotilaalliselle roolille Natossa, EU:ssa ja kansainvälisessä puolustusyhteistyössä.

Puolustusselonteon aikajänne ylittää kuluvan vaalikauden ulottuen 2030-luvulle.

**Asiasanat** puolustuspolitiikka, maanpuolustus, puolustusjärjestelmä, Nato, puolustusyhteistyö, selonteot

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I statsrådets försvarsredogörelse granskas försvarets verksamhetsmiljö och bedöms behoven att utveckla försvaret. Redogörelsen fastställer de försvarspolitiska riktlinjerna för upprätthållandet och utvecklandet av Finlands försvarsförmåga som en del av Nato.

Denna försvarsredogörelse är en fortsättning på statsrådets föregående försvarsredogörelse (Statsrådets publikationer 2021:79) och beredningen av den har styrts av den analys av omvärlden som ingår i statsrådets utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiska redogörelse (Statsrådets publikationer 2024:34). Försvarsredogörelsen har beretts i förvaltningsövergripande samarbete och vid utarbetandet av den har den parlamentariska uppföljningsgruppen hört.

Genom försvarsredogörelsen och verkställandet av den tryggas Finlands försvarsförmåga i en allvarlig och svårförutsägbar omvärld, skapas det förutsättningar för att upprätthålla och utveckla ett försvarssystem som beaktar alla domäner, dras riktlinjer upp för personalbehovet och de ekonomiska resurserna samt styrs utvecklandet av den nationella lagstiftningen. I redogörelsen har Natomedlemskapets konsekvenser beaktats på ett heltäckande sätt och i redogörelsen anges grunderna för Finlands försvarspolitiska och militära roll i Nato, EU och det internationella försvarssamarbetet.

Försvarsredogörelsens tidsperspektiv sträcker sig över innevarande valperiod till 2030-talet.

Nyckelord försvarspolitik, försvar, försvarssystem, Nato, försvarssamarbete, redogörelser

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Large-scale, protracted war returned to the European continent when Russia launched its war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022. The invasion was a continuation of the aggressive actions Russia took in Crimea and in Eastern Ukraine in 2014. The operating environment of Finnish defence is unstable and unpredictable, and the security situation could deteriorate rapidly.

Russia's confrontation with the West is felt in Finland's neighbouring regions especially through broad-spectrum influencing that targets critical infrastructure, for example. China has also stepped up its influencing attempts in Finland and in Finland's neighbouring regions.

The development of warfare is marked by the increasingly closer links between the five operational domains (land, sea, air, cyber and space) and the high speed of technological advancements. At the same time, traditional frontal warfare and large, conscription-based reserves retain their significance, and their role becomes even more obvious when war drags on.

Finland is on NATO's external border. Being part of both the Baltic Sea region and the Arctic makes Finland's location significant in terms of military strategy. Finland must sustain its capability to counter broad-spectrum influencing, resist protracted military pressure and fight large-scale wars that drag on for years, using national resources and as part of NATO.

An evolving conscription system, a trained large reserve and a strong will to defend the country are the cornerstones of Finnish defence even as a NATO Ally. In accordance with the total defence approach, Finland's defence capability relies on the support of society. Total defence and its coordination will be reinforced during the period of this report.

Finland's defence policy and military role in NATO are being shaped in a situation where the Alliance is implementing the biggest reinforcement of its deterrence and defence since the Cold War. Finland has not set any national restrictions on its NATO membership and participates in the Alliance's activities across the spectrum. The

Alliance's ability to counter the threat of Russia is especially essential for Finland. We are committed to NATO's deterrence and collective defence against all threats throughout the territory of the Alliance, based on a 360-degree approach.

Finland's accession to NATO is the greatest change to Finland's defence since the Second World War. When developing its defence, Finland takes account of NATO's common goals. The key functions of Finnish defence have been integrated into the common structures, processes and functions of the Alliance. The integration of Finnish defence into NATO's deterrence and defence will continue and deepen during the period of this report.

The territory of Finland has been assigned under Supreme Allied Commander Europe's (SACEUR) area of responsibility, and the defence of this area is planned as one entity. The military defence of Finland extends beyond the Finnish borders to a larger whole that stretches from the Baltic Sea region to the Nordic Allies in the Arctic and to the Arctic Ocean and the North Atlantic. An important objective during the period of this report is to ensure the executability of NATO's Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) Family of Plans and to exercise them regularly.

In future, all Nordic countries will be under Joint Force Command Norfolk (JFC Norfolk). Close coordination and cooperation between NATO's Joint Force Commands is imperative. In accordance with Finland's objectives, NATO will establish a Multi Corps Land Component Command (MCLCC) under JFC Norfolk and a forward presence of land forces in Finland.

Conditions will be created for the implementation of collective defence and for the deployment and sustainment of troops in Finland and regionally. These arrangements will ensure the executability of NATO's regional plan, the creation of a Nordic Joint Logistics Support Network and the implementation of the Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) between Finland and the United States.

During the period of this report, Finland will improve military mobility, logistics, host nation support, prepositioning and relevant infrastructure. To do this, Finland must improve cooperation across sectors and authorities in line with the total defence approach and deepen its cooperation with Sweden, Norway and other Allies. Military security of supply and infrastructure needed for the defence effort must be improved especially in Northern Finland, including cross-border connections to Sweden and Norway.

Finnish defence will be developed in all operational domains in collaboration with Allies. The Finnish Defence Forces will be developed based on multi-domain operations (MDO), which is a comprehensive approach spanning across services and domains. The requirements of homeland defence and the Capability Targets apportioned to Finland in the NATO Defence Planning Process will guide the Defence Forces' efforts to develop its capabilities.

The materiel development of the Finnish Defence Forces will shift its focus to land defence. The modernisation of land defence will be a complex and long-lasting process, affecting the whole defence system. The Army's capability consists of mobility, firepower and force protection. Intelligence gathering and situation awareness that harness modern technologies, target acquisition capabilities, layered and long-range firepower, force structure that enables territorial coverage, military mobility and command and control systems form the foundation of Finland's land defence capability.

Finland's maritime defence capability builds on a comprehensive awareness of the operating environment, a survivable maritime recognised picture and command and control systems. The development of maritime defence focuses on mobility, survivability and firepower. Pohjanmaa class vessels will be taken into operational use and utilised in full as part of the defence system, especially with regard to intelligence and surveillance capabilities and firepower. The firepower of coastal troops and their surveillance, protection and mobility capabilities will be improved to make them fit for repelling seaborne attacks and protecting targets as part of collective defence arrangements.

A high readiness of air and missile defence troops enables them to counter short-notice airborne attacks, if needed, and their participation in land and maritime defence nationally and in collaboration with Allies. The Finnish Defence Forces will take into operational use the F-35 fighters and the David's Sling air and missile defence system during the period of the report. These systems will support the whole defence system. The objective is that air surveillance also has longer reach, better reconnaissance capabilities and enhanced capabilities to detect and track ballistic missiles. The territorial coverage and multilayeredness of ground-based air defence and target acquisition capabilities will be improved, and the agile combat employment concept of the Air Force will be further developed.

The development of national and military cyber defence will contribute to the safeguarding of Finland's independence and the safety and security of the people. It will also secure Finland's defence capability against cyber threats and cyber

disruptions in all security situations, especially when they are state-sponsored. The information defence capabilities of the Finnish Defence Forces together with the cyber defence capabilities will help us gain and maintain information superiority.

Rapid developments in the space domain and the exploitation of space are taken into account in the defence system development. Protection against threats in or from space requires new types of competence and the development of capabilities in the future. The Finnish defence administration will draw up a space strategy for defence.

The Finnish Defence Forces is developing its other joint capabilities to support homeland defence capability and the requirements of the Alliance. The system of military intelligence is being developed to enable early warning mechanisms and support for state leadership, to ensure the systematic use of deep fires and to make use of support from the Alliance. The high readiness and reach of long-range strike capabilities restrict and limit an aggressor's possibilities of conducting, commanding and sustaining operations. The ability of the special operations forces of the Finnish Defence Forces to operate together with others will be developed both internally within the Defence Forces and externally in collaboration with other authorities and Allies. The Finnish Defence Forces will continue to develop the readiness and capabilities of its logistics system as part of NATO logistics. Integration into NATO's command and control system and the NATO Command Structure will ensure uninterrupted joint-operation capabilities.

The Finnish Defence Forces is researching and developing unmanned and autonomous systems that use latest technologies and that can be deployed in diverse ways in different domains and tasks. The defence system will utilise the powers and high readiness of the Finnish Border Guard in the surveillance and protection of territorial integrity. If needed, Border Guard troops can be integrated into the Finnish Defence Forces.

Besides NATO's collective defence, Finland's defence capabilities are made stronger by our EU membership and by international defence cooperation. Finland supports the broad use of the EU's tools to reinforce the defence capability of the EU and its Member States. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has generated new and significant EU work strands, especially focusing on the development of Member States' defence capabilities and providing military support to Ukraine. Several EU initiatives strive to deliver a more autonomous and resilient Europe. From the Finnish point of view, the EU defence industry policy brings significant added value to our support for research, development and innovation cooperation with industry.

Finland continues to reinforce its international defence cooperation. Different kinds of defence cooperation arrangements complement each other. Finland's membership in NATO opens up new possibilities for deeper and wider bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation, especially with NATO Allies. The focus of defence cooperation is on countries that are most relevant for the defence of Finland and of Finland's neighbouring regions.

Finland is committed to supporting Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised 1991 borders. Finland will continue to give Ukraine security assistance and training and materiel support.

The key prerequisites for Finnish defence will be safeguarded. Changes in the operating environment and Finland's membership in NATO have created new needs for personnel resources in the Finnish Defence Forces. In addition to the earlier increase of 500 person-years, the Defence Forces will need an additional increase of 1,500 person-years during this and the next electoral period. The personnel strength of the Ministry of Defence will have to be increased, too, during the period of this report. Personnel numbers have a critical impact on coping at work.

The integration of the Finnish defence system with NATO and the implementation of Finland's commitments as a NATO Ally will incur significant additional costs for Finnish defence. These will include the implementation of the Capability Targets apportioned to Finland, the enablement of Allied forces in Finland's territory and the modernisation process of land defence.

Finland is committed to shouldering its share of NATO's burden. This necessitates a defence budget, spanning across government terms, that is kept at least at the level of the NATO defence spending guideline. The defence budget must enable the long-term sustainment and development of defence capabilities by ensuring a sufficient balance between personnel numbers, tasks and investments in materiel.

The Ministry of Defence's branch of government continues to update the legislation so that it will meet the requirements of Finland's NATO membership and ensure the key prerequisites for the Finnish Defence Forces, considering the changed security environment. Key development needs associated with Finland's membership in NATO are related to the duties, powers and authorities of the Finnish Defence Forces, the participation of the regular personnel of the Defence Forces and those liable for military service in NATO's deterrence and defence tasks and the legal status of the individuals involved.

Making effective use of data and networks requires the systematic development of competence, culture, processes and technologies and the allocation of sufficient personnel. NATO's requirements and standards for information management and information security will be applied to the full in national development efforts. This work will be supported by the Defence Forces' independent capability to audit, certify and accredit data systems and encryption products.

The defence sector's research, development and innovation (RDI) efforts will draw on the Finnish defence administration's own technological awareness and related strategic choices and on the systematic management of competence. The research, development and innovation policy of the defence administration is developed as a whole based on national needs to meet the changed demands of the operating environment. This will require more resources. The importance of technological capabilities and technological edge as a strategic resource is evident in Finland, the EU, the NATO and in bilateral cooperation.

Military security of supply supports the needs of homeland and Allied forces operating in Finland and safeguards the functioning of the vital systems of the Finnish Defence Forces. It is based on a sufficient industrial capacity, competent personnel and stocks of prepositioned materiel that have all been prepared under normal conditions. The Finnish Defence Forces' partners and their subcontracting chains play a significant and established role in the defence system. The Defence Forces and its partners will need to be able to react quickly to changes in the operating and security environment in cooperation with our Allies and especially the Nordic countries.

An important element of military security of supply is an effective, viable and internationally competitive domestic defence industry. The export opportunities and international contacts of the Finnish defence industry must be fostered to strengthen Finland's homeland defence and security of supply.

Significant investments are made to an infrastructure that supports Finland's defence. Finland will invest in infrastructure required by NATO's collective defence, including the presence of NATO and NATO forces in Finland, and by Finland's Defence Cooperation Agreement with the United States. In addition, the focus of investments is on usable, effective and healthy facilities of the Defence Forces. The needs to develop the protection and continuity management of infrastructure critical to homeland defence will be evaluated in cross-government cooperation under the lead of the Ministry of Defence.

The energy transition will be taken into account in the development of the logistics and support network and in the capability development of the Finnish Defence Forces. Efforts to advance wind-power construction without compromising the needs of homeland defence will continue. All of the Finnish Defence Forces' national and international activities take into account the effective management of environmental risks and the prevention of environmental damage without endangering the defence capability.

The Finnish defence administration must continue to enhance its capacity to detect information influence activities, analyse the information environment and employ strategic communications. To counter threats, official activities must be coordinated in advance and the national military strategic communications must be consolidated with the strategic communications of NATO and our most important Allies.



# 1 Introduction

The Government Defence Report to Parliament is based on the Programme of Prime Minister Petteri Orpo's Government.

The report looks at the developments in the operating environment of defence and evaluates the needs of defence in the medium term. It defines the defence policy guidelines for the sustainment and development of Finland's defence capability as part of NATO and for Finland's defence political and military role in NATO, the EU and international defence cooperation.

This Government Defence Report is a continuation of the previous report (Publications of the Finnish Government 2021:80) and is closely linked to strategic planning in the defence administration. The preparation of the report was guided by the analysis of the operating environment presented in the Government report on Finnish foreign and security policy (Publications of the Finnish Government 2024:35). It also considered the position of Parliament on the said government report.

The main goals of Finland's foreign and security policy are to safeguard Finland's independence and territorial integrity, to avoid becoming involved in a military conflict and to ensure the safety, security and wellbeing of the people of Finland. Active defence policy and a strong homeland defence capability as part of the Alliance are key conditions for achieving the goals of Finland's foreign and security policy.

As a NATO member, Finland's defence concept consists of a strong conscription-based homeland defence capability as part of NATO's deterrence and defence.

The Government Defence Report was drawn up under the leadership of the Ministry of Defence together with the Finnish Defence Forces. It has been prepared in cooperation with the Office of the President of the Republic of Finland, the Prime Minister's Office and the ministries. The Government and the President of the Republic of Finland and the Ministerial Committee on Foreign and Security Policy have provided the political guidance for the work.

The Government has set up a parliamentary monitoring group for the report. Parliament will give a position on the report.

The Government Defence Report spans over the current electoral term into the 2030s. The Report and its implementation ensure that Finland's defence capability meets the requirements of the operating environment.

## 2 Operating environment of Finnish Defence

Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the security environment of Finland and Europe has deteriorated fundamentally and far into the future. Russia's aggressive and unlawful military actions have undermined the international rules-based order and endangered peace and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. Large-scale, protracted warfare has returned to the European continent. The risk of the war spreading cannot be ruled out.

### 2.1 Shift in the global balance of power

The shifting global balance of power affects the operating environment of Finnish defence. Intensifying strategic competition and global rivalry between democracies and authoritarian states are leading to an increasingly fragmented and regionalised multilateral cooperation. The United States and China are competing for political, military, economic and technological dominance in the world. Russia, on the other hand, is seeking confrontation with the United States and the wider Western community, to some extent in cooperation with China.

The United States seeks to retain its position as the leading great power. It is committed to defending Europe, but in essence its long-term strategy is to respond to the challenge of China. The United States not only expects European countries to share the burden of European security, but they are also expected to collaborate with the United States in the strategic competition. The level of commitment of each US administration to multilateral cooperation is also reflected in transatlantic cooperation. In the long term, the United States sees China's growing influence and military build-up as the only credible threat to its own global position.

China strives to enhance its global influence by creating economic, political and technological dependencies in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, South America and the Indo-Pacific. China's ambitions and policies challenge the interests, security and values of NATO Allies and EU Member States. China employs a broad range of tools to increase its influence, such as illegal intelligence and industrial espionage, infrastructure investments, coercive trade policy, exploitation of cyber and space

domains, and malicious use of emerging and disruptive technologies. China is in the process of modernising its armed forces and increasing the capacity of its nuclear arsenal with a view to becoming a military great power by mid-century. China has increased its military cooperation with Russia.

The European Union (EU) seeks to bolster its role in order to respond to global pressures for change, to address its internal challenges and especially to tackle the deterioration of its security environment. Recurrent shocks in Europe, at the EU's external borders and in its neighbouring regions are challenging the EU's ability to act decisively. On the other hand, cooperation in the EU has deepened in many areas, especially in security and defence. The EU has become an increasingly important actor.

## 2.2 Russia

The illegal war of aggression Russia launched against Ukraine in February 2022 is a continuation of the aggressive actions Russia took in Georgia in 2008 and in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014. Russia's invasion of Ukraine and its efforts to destabilise countries in the EU's eastern neighbourhood manifest a long-term trend where Russia seeks to consolidate its great power status and to re-establish the division of Europe into spheres of influence by increasing its influence, even by openly using military force. Russia is the most significant and direct threat to Allies' security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Russia's aggression against Ukraine is a step towards a more open, unpredictable and protracted confrontation with the West. Russia has targeted malicious hybrid activities, including sabotage, against many European countries. It can rapidly launch long-lasting military pressure. In Ukraine, Russia has demonstrated its readiness to use extensive military force and to target vital functions of society and civilian populations to pursue its political goals.

Russia's war in Ukraine has revealed its readiness to take great risks despite losses, creating instability in Finland's neighbouring regions. Russian security thinking shows an ambition to achieve strategic depth and to create an unbroken buffer zone in Europe, reaching from the Arctic to the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea and on to the Mediterranean. Heightened international tensions in one region may rapidly lead to increased military activities in other regions as well.

Russia maintains and develops nuclear deterrence, conventional deterrence that relies on long-range weapons systems and a power projection capability, and armed forces capable of large-scale warfare. Russia has intensified its nuclear messaging. It emphasises the importance of nuclear weapons and broad-spectrum influencing.

Russia uses broad-spectrum influencing which includes hybrid activities and, when necessary, the use of military force, to promote its strategic goals. Moreover, it uses these tools continuously below the threshold of open conflict, and it can flexibly adjust the intensity and range of its tools to pursue its political goals. Its goals include upsetting the target country's unity, hampering decision-making, manipulating public opinion, sparking confrontation, creating fear and obscuring situational awareness. To support its political goals, Russia also continues its active intelligence and influence activities online alongside more traditional information collection and espionage. Russia uses not only state authorities but also businesses, educational institutions and research institutes as well as activists and criminal groups.

The collaboration between Russia and China is partly based on their converging strategic interests and partly on their deteriorated relations with the West. Developments in the relationship between Russia and China – in particular, Russia's increasing dependence on China for the development of its capabilities and China's support to Russia – will affect European security. Russia is deepening its partnerships even with other sympathetic countries, such as North Korea and Iran. Because of its location and its support to Russia, Belarus plays an important role in Russia's war of aggression and in exerting pressure on NATO and the EU.

Russia has been able to maintain and in part even develop its warfighting capability despite its ongoing combat operations and major losses of men and materiel, enabled by a raise in the production capacity of the Russian arms industry and support from sympathetic countries.

## 2.3 NATO

Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the shifts in global power relations are shaping the operating environment in Europe and in Finland in many ways far into the future. NATO's deterrence and defence and the Alliance's role as a security provider for the Allies have grown in significance. While NATO is committed to supporting Ukraine on a long-term basis, it is also constraining its role to avoid being pulled into direct conflict with Russia.

Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, NATO has systematically continued the efforts it started in 2014 to respond to the deteriorating security environment. The 2022 Strategic Concept reaffirms deterrence and defence as the key purpose of the Alliance. NATO is undergoing its most significant transformation since the end of the Cold War. It must be ready to deliver the full range of forces needed for large-scale, high-intensity, multi-domain warfighting against nuclear-armed peer-competitors. Its deterrence and defence cover the entire territory of the Alliance and are directed against all threats, from all directions. NATO and its members are in the process of developing their capabilities to counter different kinds of hybrid threats below the threshold of open conflict. NATO's other core tasks besides deterrence and defence are crisis prevention and management and cooperative security. NATO has deepened its partnerships especially with its Indo-Pacific partners (Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea). The Strategic Concept also stresses the critical importance of NATO members' national resilience and NATO's collective resilience.

NATO's overall deterrence consists of three elements: conventional forces and capabilities, missile defence and nuclear weapons. These are supplemented by space and cyber capabilities. The 2022 Summit in Madrid agreed on a new baseline for NATO's deterrence and defence posture. The subsequent Summits in Vilnius in 2023 and in Washington in 2024 agreed on measures guiding the implementation of the new baseline. NATO has increased its presence on land, in the air and at sea, especially in its eastern flank. For the moment, it has placed a forward presence in eight eastern Allies. NATO will have presence in Finland, too, in the near future.

NATO has a Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) Family of Plans, including regional plans that are exercised and updated regularly. It has introduced a new NATO Force Model to ensure sufficient forces both in peacetime and crisis. Reorganising NATO's command and force structures and developing its command and control arrangements are essential for the strengthening of NATO's deterrence and defence. NATO has improved its readiness and organised more military exercises than before.

NATO has raised the level of ambition for the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) to better respond to developments in the threat environment. Allies have significantly increased their defence investments and made an enduring commitment to a jointly agreed minimum level of defence spending. Bearing in mind that many Allies drove down their defence capability in the post-Cold War era, it will take years and extensive defence investment to restore their defence capability. NATO's ability to act is highly dependent on the unity of the Alliance and

on the Allies' enduring commitment to defence spending. Considering the threat of Russia and the long timespans of capability development, NATO's priorities are expected to remain largely unchanged in the next few years.

The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO and the Defence Cooperation Agreements (DCA) with the United States are reshuffling the strategic landscape in Northern Europe. NATO's land mass and airspace have grown significantly in the Arctic, which the Alliance will take into consideration in its collective planning, activities and resources. NATO has now a strong and coherent area in the north, stretching from the Arctic to the Baltic Sea, only consisting of NATO member states. For the first time, the defence of this area will be planned, exercised and implemented as a whole. This creates stronger deterrence in the strategic set-up in Northern Europe, creating a balance against Russia's military power in the north. From the military perspective, this allows better use of strategic depth in force projection and in sustainment, for example.

Finland's neighbouring regions include the areas of the most strategic importance for Russia: Moscow, St Petersburg, the Kola peninsula and Kaliningrad as well as Belarus, which is in Russia's sphere of influence. The military significance of the Baltic Sea has grown as part of the great power competition. It is an important region for trade, security of supply, oil and gas transport and military freedom of action. The natural resources of the Arctic continental shelf and the emergence of the Northeast Passage as a route for maritime transport and trade increase competition and build up tensions in the Arctic, where Russia has placed its strategically most important military capabilities. The Arctic is also increasingly a region of interest for China because of its natural resources and transport routes. China has developed its capacity to advance its interests in the region by amplifying the security focus of its Arctic Policy and by increasing its military presence in the region.

As all Nordic countries are in NATO, Russia views the Nordic region as an integral part of the Western community and a party to the confrontation with Russia. It has announced its plans to strengthen its military capabilities in its Western flank in response. Russia's ambitions to increase its influence in the Baltic Sea and the Arctic underline the need to strengthen NATO's deterrence and defence in Northern Europe and on the eastern flank.

NATO's enlargement to the north makes it possible for the Alliance to have a coordinated command of its military capabilities and to use them flexibly in the Baltic Sea and the Arctic. The Alliance's ability to control its territory, and thereby retain the individual and Allied freedom of action, enable the protection of



critical infrastructure, the maintenance of the vital lines of communication in the West and an effective collective defence across all domains. securing sea lines of communications in the North Atlantic is a key to ensuring the deployment of reinforcements from North America to Europe.

## 2.4 European Union

The EU's role in foreign, security and defence policy has grown because of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. Its defence dimension is undergoing a major transformation, and the EU is deepening its defence cooperation. The EU is strengthening its role in defence issues, providing its Member States more tools to develop their deterrence and defence.

The unity of the EU is more important than ever in this era of strategic competition. Europe must shoulder a larger share of its own defence, and it must continue to develop its military capabilities.

Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has generated new and significant EU work strands, focusing on the development of Member States' defence capabilities and the provision of military support to Ukraine. Alongside the EU's support to Ukraine, the EU's sanctions regime and its decisions to reduce the EU's dangerous dependencies on Russia and China have made the EU more capable and a stronger regional actor. This development creates both possibilities and expectations for the EU's defence dimension.

The EU's defence cooperation is guided by the 2022 Strategic Compass and the strategy documents implementing it. The EU uses a comprehensive toolbox to develop military capabilities in Europe, to bolster the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) and to strengthen the safety and security of EU citizens. In the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), EU Member States commit themselves to developing defence in comprehensive ways. The European Commission is getting a stronger role in the development of defence in the near future. The Commission aims to reinforce the EDTIB and channel more funding to defence through various EU financial mechanisms. The EU's role in the new operational domains grows as the EU develops its own space capabilities and tools for managing the cyber and information domains. The EU also strives to make its military crisis management operations and missions more effective.

The roles of NATO and the EU for the security of Europe are complementary and mutually reinforcing. Cooperation between the EU and NATO has progressed in recent years in such areas as countering hybrid threats, protecting critical infrastructure and developing military mobility. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has opened up better opportunities for the EU and NATO to make their actions and roles even more complementary.

## 2.5 Neighbouring states and other key actors

Russia's invasion of Ukraine was a watershed that restored military capability development and defence spending to the heart of the security and defence policy in Europe. This is especially evident in Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea region. In 2024, the Nordic countries, the Baltic States, Poland and Germany all meet NATO's target of investing at least two per cent of their gross domestic product (GDP) in defence. In the east of the Alliance, the Baltic States and Poland will be spending from 3.2 per cent to 4.7 per cent of GDP on defence in the near future. Sweden and Norway are expected to reach 2.6 per cent of GDP by 2030 at the latest.

The altered security situation has had a significant impact on the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO). Finland and Sweden joining NATO and Denmark deciding to opt in the EU's defence cooperation make it possible to deepen the Nordic Defence Cooperation. The Nordic countries are committed to defending each other as NATO Allies. The deepening of the Nordic Defence Cooperation will help plan and implement the defence of the Allied territory.

Sweden and Norway are developing their armed forces with a focus on increasing the number of their wartime troops, procuring defence materiel and improving their capabilities to operate at home and elsewhere in the territory of NATO at the same time. They are also strengthening their role in host nation support and as transit nations for reinforcements. Sweden has named six Allies in its neighbouring region (Finland, Denmark, Norway, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) to which its armed forces must have the capacity to deploy troops. Denmark is developing its armed forces with a focus on strengthening its capabilities and improving its conscription system.

The Baltic States are reinforcing their homeland defence and developing their capabilities to flexibly receive and host Allied reinforcements in their territory. Estonia focuses on strengthening the materiel capabilities of its armed forces, in

particular weapons, ammunition and infrastructure, and continues to develop its conscription system. Latvia and Lithuania are in the process of reinstating general conscription.

The United States retains its strong military role in Northern Europe. It has further increased its presence, exercises and infrastructure investment in Europe. The United States has bilateral defence cooperation agreements with each of the NATO Allies in the Baltic Sea region, enabling deeper cooperation. This will improve NATO's abilities to execute collective defence. However, developments in the Indo-Pacific will have impact on the future distribution of US military force and presence.

Following Russia's war of aggression, several major European countries, such as the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, France and Poland, have invested in strengthening their defence capabilities. The UK is committed to strengthening the security of Northern Europe, and it has increased its presence in the Baltic Sea region. It aims to respond to all threats, using all available means, in close cooperation its Allies. Soon after Russia invaded Ukraine, the UK made bilateral commitments with both Finland and Sweden to support each other, with military means, if necessary, in the event of a disaster or an attack befalling on Finland or Sweden.

The major shift of Germany's security and defence policy has great significance for European defence. Germany is committed to strengthening NATO's collective defence and has substantially increased its financing to strengthen the capabilities of its armed forces. It is also in the process of raising the number of armed forces personnel. France will continue to advance its security policy goals globally. However, it will also prepare for a high-intensity conflict in Europe because of Russia's aggression against Ukraine. France aims to double its defence appropriations to strengthen its armed forces. Poland's role in and regional influence on the defence of Europe are on the rise. It is strengthening its defence capabilities with major materiel procurements. Due to its location, it is also a logistic hub for deliveries of reinforcements from different countries to Ukraine.

There are several multilateral initiatives and county groups that support European defence cooperation: the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) led by the UK, the Framework Nation Concept (FNC) led by Germany, the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) led by France as well as the Northern Group and the Nordic-Baltic defence cooperation. The JEF, especially, is expected to gain a stronger role in Northern Europe.

## 2.6 Development of warfare

The five operational domains of warfare – land, sea, air, cyber and space – are increasingly interrelated in the development of warfare. Western countries are developing their armed forces based on a multi-domain approach. NATO has adopted the Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) concept that helps Allies synchronise their multi-domain development efforts in a compatible way. The objective is to make use of military actions in all domains so that their combined impact can be harnessed appropriately in the physical, cognitive and virtual dimensions. The MDO concepts underline the importance of a fast flow of digital information and a data-centric approach in enabling command and control and decision-making that are faster than those of any adversary. This also requires an ability and freedom of action in the electromagnetic spectrum. Military actions are coordinated with relevant non-military measures as part of total defence.

Technological development has a fundamental impact on the future of the battlefield and on the ways of fighting. Technological advancements enable more efficient information collection and data processing, heightened situational awareness, faster decision-making and more precise and longer reach of engagement. The importance of remotely-operated and autonomous unmanned systems is growing in modern warfare. They will change the future of war, operations and the battlefield. Anticipating advancements in technology, integrating emerging technologies into defence systems and making use of the unexpected become increasingly important as the pace of technological development picks up speed in the future. Technological edge can compensate for numerical inferiority. The ethical and judicial challenges of artificial intelligence, augmented cognition, synthetic biology and the augmentation of human capabilities must be resolved.

Developments in infrastructure and technology and the growing number of users offer greater opportunities for hostile actions in the cyber domain. Western countries are constantly facing intelligence gathering on information networks, cyber espionage and cyberattacks by hostile actors who also strive to have physical impact on Western critical infrastructure. Alongside state actors, the role of politically motivated or state-led non-state actors as orchestrators of hostile activities is growing.

The exploitation of space is an essential element of the landscape of warfare, and space is one of the arenas of great power competition in technology. The pace of advancements in space technology is accelerating, access to space is becoming easier and the military use of space is increasing. Modern weapons systems and

command and control are increasingly dependent on systems operating in space. Space technology based services are widely used by many functions critical for the national security of supply, such as telecommunications operators, energy producers, financial operators and internal security providers. Commercial space business is booming, and companies are producing new services with military uses at a greater pace than ever before. At the same time, capabilities to disrupt or deny services or destroy satellites are also being developed. These factors and space debris are the greatest threats to the safe use of space. Having the ability to ensure access to essential services in all situations, to protect one's space capabilities and deny hostile action is especially important.

NATO and EU members are facing intense information influence activities that also deploy artificial intelligence. The harmful use of information has become an everyday part of broad-spectrum influencing. The confrontation between Western democracies and authoritarian regimes has increased competition in the information environment.

Observations and lessons learned from Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine will shape the future of war and affect the development of armed forces of EU Member States and NATO Allies. The strong will of the Ukrainians to defend their country and the resilience of the Ukrainian society as well as the military, economic, political and humanitarian support provided to Ukraine by the Western community have played a key role in Ukraine's defence of its independence in accordance with the UN Charter. Russia's war of aggression and Ukraine's defensive war demonstrate how comprehensive and extensive warfare can be. Traditional frontal warfare and large, conscription-based reserves will retain their significance even as new domains, methods and means of warfighting develop, and their role becomes even more obvious when war drags on.

Russia's military actions against Ukraine show the great importance of deterrence, resilience, rapid readiness, strong defence capability and a strong will to defend one's country. On one hand, the war has demonstrated the importance of firepower and protection from it, while on the other hand it has shown the significance of high-quality, commercially produced dual-use technology. Observations from Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine show that maintaining air superiority and conducting large-scale operations and combined and joint operations are still integral to warfare. In Ukraine, the whole society has been under fire from all operational domains, underlining the importance of developing total defence and preparedness.

Besides possessing rare, technologically-advanced systems and munition, armed forces should also be capable of sustained high-intensity attrition warfare. This means that society, and its defence industry, must be able to support the armed forces. Western countries have identified a need to deepen cooperation between governments and defence industry on a long-term basis especially to safeguard sufficient domestic ammunition production. Moreover, rapid technological development leads to a weapons/counter-weapons race where success, especially for smaller states, comes from making extensive use of innovation resources.

The mass use of forces and means of warfare and the widespread destruction of infrastructure are a challenge to societies' resilience and to people's willingness to defend their country. This sets certain demands on the safeguarding of people's living conditions, the protecting and repairing of critical infrastructure and on the Finnish Defence Forces' ability to sustain high-intensity activities in attrition warfare. Armed forces in Western countries focus on safeguarding military security of supply in all situations and domains, including host-nation support for multinational forces.

## **2.7 Climate change, terrorism and violent extremist organisations and the prospects of crisis management**

Protracted wars and unresolved conflicts will go on especially in the Middle East and Africa, and they will have an increasingly direct impact on the security of Europe and Finland. Armed conflicts breed terrorism and political extremism. The spread of violent extremist organisations to new areas is a major threat to the populations in these areas and to their neighbouring countries as well as to the security of Europe. It creates a potential breeding ground for terrorism and for major migration flows. The security situation in the Middle East and Africa is characterised by several protracted conflicts, which also have a strong regional and cross-border dimension.

Terrorism is a major threat to NATO Allies and EU Member States. Terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, is the most direct asymmetric threat to NATO. State actors, too, can exploit it as a tool of broad-spectrum influencing. Large numbers of actors, diverse threats and the absence of clear borders are key factors impeding efforts to counter terrorism. The methods and dimensions of terrorism are constantly evolving.

Climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution have both direct and indirect effects on Finland's security. The combination of climate change and unbalanced demographic trends in fragile states aggravate the threat of conflicts. In developing our defence, we must consider extreme weather events that have direct impact on infrastructure, defence materiel and the personnel's performance.

In recent years, military crisis management operations have mostly been smaller operations and training missions, encompassing defence capacity building in third countries, among other measures. At the same time, crisis management operations are conducted in increasingly demanding and unpredictable conditions. Russia's aggression against Ukraine violates the international rules-based order and will likely create a need for new crisis management operations and for changes to existing operations. The future of crisis management and counterterrorism measures will depend on the need for post-war reconstruction in Ukraine and the increasing instability in the Middle East.



### **Key factors of change affecting the operating environment of Finnish defence**

- There is a war in Europe, and the risk of its spreading cannot be ruled out. There is a heightened risk of an armed conflict in which Finland would be involved.
- The outcome of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has great relevance for the security developments in Europe and in Finland.
- The development of Russia's military capabilities and its political aspirations pose a protracted security threat to Europe and to Finland also in the future.
- Broad-spectrum influencing against Finland and the Alliance continues at a high level.
- Western armed forces must be capable of sustained high-intensity attrition war.
- Western countries must increase and deepen their cooperation with the defence industry quickly and on the long term. This includes expansion of the production capacity of domestic defence industry and better conditions for export as well as utilising to the full the EU's joint initiatives and funding.
- NATO must maintain its technological edge in warfare, which would prevent it from being drawn into a protracted war of attrition.
- NATO's strength is its unity and ability to defend the whole territory of the Alliance.
- Developments in the security environment necessitate a stronger deterrence and defence posture especially in NATO's eastern and northern flanks.
- With Finland and Sweden part of the Alliance, NATO is able to plan, exercise and implement its collective defence efficiently across Northern Europe.
- There are growing demands for Finland to maintain and develop its defence capability while Finland's economic situation remains tough.

## 2.8 Key effects on Finnish defence

Finland's security environment has deteriorated fundamentally and in the long term especially due to Russia's aggressive actions. The security situation is difficult and unpredictable, and it may change rapidly. There is no end in sight to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, and the threat of Russian military operations expanding beyond Ukraine cannot be ruled out. No sudden turn for the better is to be expected even if active military operations in Ukraine were to end.

Finland is on NATO's external border. Being part of both the Baltic Sea region and the Arctic makes Finland's location significant in terms of military strategy. Our joining NATO has reinforced our deterrence, raising the threshold of using military force against Finland. Russia's confrontation with the West is felt in Finland's neighbouring regions especially through broad-spectrum influencing that target critical infrastructure and instrumentalise migration, for example. While China does not pose a direct military threat to Europe or to Finland, it is stepping up its influencing attempts in Finland and in Finland's neighbouring regions.

Since invading Ukraine, Russia has moved its forces and materiel away from the Finnish border to Ukraine. Russia will strengthen its military presence and activity in its northwestern flank in practically all domains as soon as the progress of its aggression against Ukraine and its disposable resources allow.


Finland must always and in all security situations be prepared for the use or threat of military force against Finland as well as for political pressure. Finland ensures that it has the capabilities to resist prolonged military pressure and counter protracted large-scale warfighting with national resources and as part of NATO. A strong deterrence and defence posture is the only means of preventing military pressure and the use of force against Finland. This requires sufficient resources. At the same time, central government adjustment measures in Finland make it more challenging to secure sufficient resources necessary for the long-term development of Finland's defence and total defence.

As part of NATO's DDA Family of Plans for the defence of the Allied territory, the military defence of Finland extends beyond the Finnish borders to a larger whole that stretches from the Baltic Sea region to the Nordic Allies in the Arctic and to the Arctic Ocean and the North Atlantic Ocean. Finland's national interest is that NATO's deterrence and defence are strong and fit to meet the requirements of the evolving security environment. Finland is a small country, and besides NATO our involvement and interests in the strategic competition are realised to a significant degree through the European Union. Strategic competition entails that the European

Union must keep its unity and reinforce its strategic autonomy. Active bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation strengthens the ability of Finland and Allies to implement NATO's collective defence.

The changes taking place in the operating environment also have a multitude of impacts on national developments in Finland, giving rise to new elements of uncertainty affecting the safety and security of the Finnish society. This requires overall resilience of society, crisis preparedness and response in line with both comprehensive security and total defence, and leadership in matters involving comprehensive security.

**Figure 1.** The strategic interests of Finnish defence



### **The strategic interests of Finnish defence**

Finland must have the ability, drawing on its own resources as part of NATO, to counter large-scale, high-intensity warfare that develops rapidly and is fought over a long period. Following the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, the Nordic countries, the Baltic Sea region and the High North form a coherent geostrategic entity with strong links to the defence of Finland's territory.

The Baltic Sea region is of strategic importance to Finland and to all the Baltic Sea states. The safeguarding of uninterrupted trade, incident-free maritime transport and undersea infrastructure is critical to ensuring the continued safety, security and functioning of society in Finland.

In the High North, Finland's objectives as part of NATO are to secure critical infrastructure and to protect the sea lines of communication in the North Atlantic all the way to the Arctic Ocean.

Securing continued military support to Ukraine serves the interests of Finnish defence. Developments in Ukraine affect fundamentally the evolution of the security situation in the rest of Europe.

Finland bears its share of responsibility as part of the international community by contributing to the peace and stability efforts of the UN, NATO, the EU, the OSCE and country groups. Finland is committed to NATO's three core tasks: deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security.

### 3 Current status of defence

Finland is a militarily allied country. Joining NATO is the greatest change to Finland's defence since the Second World War. **Finland's defence concept** as a NATO Ally is based on a strong conscription-based homeland defence capability as part of NATO's deterrence and defence.

**Defence capability** means the ability for military defence and the Finnish Defence Forces' ability to carry out its statutory duties. Besides the Alliance's collective defence, Finland's defence capability is supplemented by our membership of the European Union and by other international defence cooperation.

**Homeland defence capability** is a combination of the **defence system** and of the support **total defence** gives to it. Finland will defend its territory, population and society with all available resources together with Allies.

Finland sustains and develops our own defence capability in all security situations, taking account of NATO's common goals. The key functions of Finnish defence have been integrated into NATO's common structures, processes and functions. Following Finland's accession to NATO, the deterrent effect of Finland's defence is considerably stronger than before. Any use of military force against Finland will be prevented together with Allies. If deterrence fails, military attacks will be repelled.

A conscription system, a trained large reserve and a strong will to defend the country are the cornerstones of Finland's defence. The conscription system is vital for Finland to train a sufficient number of versatile troops. A large and well-trained reserve ensures the territorial coverage and sustainability of Finnish troops alone and as part of NATO. Keeping a strong will to defend the country is critical to Finnish defence.

Finns' strong will to defend their country is founded on national unity and on the belief that Finland is worth defending. It is the foundation of total defence and comprehensive security and boosts the resilience of society. Russia's aggression against Ukraine has further strengthened the significance of the above-mentioned foundation of Finland's defence capability. Finland has developed its defence

capability systematically and long-term to ensure that it adapts to the changing operating environment and meets Finland's commitments as a member of NATO and the EU.

The **sufficient allocation of appropriations and personnel** is critical to sustaining and developing Finland's defence capability. At the moment, Finland's defence spending aligns with NATO's current guideline of spending at least 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) on defence due to the ongoing strategic capability projects to improve Finland's air defence and maritime defence. The defence budget must be kept at least at the minimum level agreed by NATO Allies even after the strategic capability projects have been concluded to sustain and develop Finland's defence capability. The additional appropriations allocated to readiness and preparedness and to replacing the defence materiel delivered to Ukraine do not permanently raise the level of defence spending.


#### **Finnish Defence Forces' personnel under normal conditions**

- Regular personnel of the Defence Forces 13,000
- Annual training numbers: around 20,000 conscripts and around 1,000 voluntary women
- Refresher and voluntary training for reservists annually:
  - Compulsory training 28,000 persons
  - Voluntary training 8,000 persons
  - Training events of the National Defence Training Association of Finland around 21,000 persons

The reform of the Defence Forces of 2012–2015 cut the number of personnel employed by the Defence Forces by around 2,300 persons to 12,000 persons. The personnel numbers will be raised in line with the Government Defence Report of 2021 by 500 person-years. Changes in the operating environment and Finland's accession to NATO entail a need to increase personnel numbers significantly (see section 4.8.1).

The Finnish defence administration has insufficient staff in relation to its duties and obligations. The previous Government Defence Report identified a need to increase the number of personnel by 500 in tasks related to readiness and training and the taking into operational use of new capabilities. The implementation of this increase will be accelerated and allocated to the Defence Forces in 2023–2026. Finland's accession to NATO, the changes in the security environment and the deepening defence cooperation have further aggravated the imbalance of duties and available human resources both in the Defence Forces and in the Ministry of Defence. The process of assigning personnel to NATO-related tasks in Finland and abroad and of amending the terms of employment is underway but will continue for years to come. Recent crises and wars have shown the need to ensure a long-lasting warfighting capability, where personnel play a key role.

**Figure 2.** Finnish Defence Forces' wartime strength



**Total defence** has grown in importance with the deterioration of the security situation, and it has been further developed by several branches of government since the previous Government Defence Report. In line with the previous report, the Finnish defence administration has reviewed the state of total defence in light of the changed security environment and started the planning of further measures accordingly.

Developments in the operating environment have stressed the need of other branches of government to prepare for supporting the Finnish Defence Forces in a protracted, high-intensity attrition warfare that affects the whole society.

According to the principles of total defence, the resources of various sectors of society are directed at supporting military operations and other defence tasks as required. At the same time, functions vital to society are maintained at a level appropriate for the prevailing security situation. Each authority has an obligation to prepare for carrying out its duties in all security situations.

Total defence and security of supply need a domestic defence industry that operates in both normal conditions and emergency conditions. Domestic defence industry is a key to maintaining Finland's central weapons systems, to developing new capabilities and to increasing the capacity to produce defence materiel. Moreover, the Finnish defence and security industry is a significant employer and essential for Finland's homeland defence capability. For example, the direct domestic employment effect has been estimated at 4,500 person-years for the F-35 procurement programme and at 3,500 person-years for the Squadron 2020 programme by the end of the decade.

While the Finnish defence industry production mainly serves the domestic market, exports have accounted for a significant proportion of the industry's turnover in recent years. The need to raise the capacity of the domestic defence industry and ensure its competitive strength and operating conditions has increased sharply. The industry has stepped up its manufacturing of explosives and raised its readiness for emergency conditions. The importance of European defence industry has been recognised, and it is being strengthened with the support of the EU's financial instruments for defence.

The partnerships between the Finnish Defence Forces and private sector service providers have an established and significant role for Finnish defence in all security situations. Cooperation between the Defence Forces and partners is being developed and tested in national exercises. The changed operating environment and Finland's accession to NATO underscore the requirements of military security of supply, preparedness and activities in emergency conditions in all forms of partnership.

**Finland's military defence system** is a combination of subsystems that produces the capabilities required for military defence. Its level of readiness is adjusted according to threat. Its ability to survey all operational domains has been improved over the past few years. Close cooperation between branches of government and



other key actors, including international partners, is particularly important in terms of space domain, cyber domain, information dimension, electromagnetic spectrum, and intelligence.

The current command and force structure of the Finnish Defence Forces is guided by the requirements of homeland defence and should be reviewed from the perspective of Finland's membership in NATO. The defence administration has been integrated into NATO's response and preparedness systems. The related national mechanisms for implementation and decision-making are currently being reviewed under the lead of the defence administration.

In 2024, around 19,000 persons completed **military service**, including 900 women who completed voluntary military service. General conscription has been modernised based on the objectives set out in a report by a parliamentary committee appointed for the purpose. A working group examining ways to reform call-ups published its report in January 2024. It identified increasing young people's awareness of homeland defence and improving their mental wellbeing and physical abilities as key objectives. The goal is that as many as possible of the age group liable for military service complete it and that the number of women in voluntary military service keeps growing.

The number of **refresher training events** has been significantly raised, and more staff have been assigned to training duties with the help of additional funding received in spring 2022. Around 28,000 reservists attended refresher training in 2023, and the number of training days in voluntary national defence has increased considerably.

**Voluntary national defence** training brings together all groups of citizens and boosts the will to defend the country. It is being developed based on the needs of society and especially those of the Defence Forces. In the coming years, these efforts will be guided by a vision for voluntary national defence to be completed by the end of 2024.

The **materiel development of the Finnish Defence Forces** has continued in line with the policies outlined in the previous report and in several development programmes. The allocation of additional funding in spring 2022 was a significant boost to materiel readiness, allowing the Defence Forces to increase its stocks of munition and to raise the level of sustainment. While the self-sufficiency ratio of materiel readiness has been raised, shortcomings in materiel readiness and self-sufficiency still persist, and further measures are needed to redress them. Finland

has started the process of integrating the Capability Targets apportioned to Finland in the NATO Defence Planning Process into the Defence Forces' development programme.

Finland has **supported Ukraine** with significant deliveries of defence materiel. This support has been based on meticulous risk-based considerations, taking into account Ukraine's needs and Finland's capacity to hand over materiel, including the possibilities of replacing the capabilities within the time frame critical to safeguarding Finland's defence capability. Materiel donations to Ukraine have also been acquired directly from the domestic defence industry. It is critical to the safeguarding of Finland's defence capability that the Finnish Defence Forces receives additional funding to replace in full the materiel handed over to Ukraine. In addition, the Defence Forces has participated in the European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) and in Operation Interflex, which is a training programme led by the United Kingdom.

Since the previous report, the quantity and quality of **cooperation between ministries and public authorities** have increased. Preparing for and countering broad-spectrum influencing will require closer national and international cooperation between different authorities even in the future. A sufficient level of response will be achieved through cooperation between the security authorities in accordance with each authority's duties and powers.

Since the previous report, the most notable events in the Finnish Defence Forces' participation in **military crisis management** missions and operations were the termination of the mission in Afghanistan, the participation in EUMAM Ukraine and the reinforcing of the Kosovo Force (KFOR). Finland's participation in the UN and EU missions in Mali has ended. Finland's operational contribution to Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) in Iraq will draw to a close at the end of 2024. A rescue and evacuation operation in Afghanistan in 2021 was the first time a national decision was taken under the Finnish legislation governing the making of decisions concerning the provision of and request for international assistance. Since then, Finland has participated in NATO's collective peacetime activities based on the same provisions.

Finland's **land defence** is built on the needs of homeland defence. The readiness and capabilities of the Finnish Army have been improved. Deeper defence cooperation has allowed the Army to improve its readiness and striking capability. Closer cooperation in land defence and air defence has improved the Army's combat power both nationally and as part of NATO.

The operational forces and local forces have been developed as a package, focusing on mobility, combat power and materiel readiness. Exercises have improved the interoperability of forces and their ability to counter broad-spectrum influencing. In combat, local forces and operational forces would together engage the enemy, prevent its advance and, if necessary, counterattack to defeat the enemy and force its retreat from the territory of Finland. Exercises have focused on regional and local characteristics and tasks as well as on finding solutions at the local level together with other authorities and actors. Practices for the construction of fortifications and other protective facilities have also been developed as part of this cooperation. The Army's force structure has been revised, and inspections and exercises have been used to improve the ability to mobilise forces.

Force protection and firepower have been strengthened in all Services by procuring individual and troop-specific equipment. The Finnish Army's intelligence, fires and international cooperation capabilities have been developed through additional acquisitions for command and control. A procurement of more K9 armoured howitzers will raise the artillery's ability to sustain the Army's combat power and increase the survivability of artillery units. In addition, the Army has improved its self-sufficiency in munition as well as its anti-tank capabilities.

The Finnish Army's capability for mobile operations will decrease significantly in the 2030s, unless the current fleet of armoured infantry combat vehicles and main battle tanks is sustained and capabilities at the end of their life-cycle are replaced, and new ones acquired. As to the systems to be sustained, the multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) and the main battle tank fleet need mid-life upgrades and performance updates. The most significant of the ageing systems are the infantry combat vehicles, the engineering pontoon equipment and the capabilities of the artillery and mortars to support the Army in close combat. In addition, the mobility capabilities of mechanised forces, and the arctic mobility of the Army will be safeguarded. The transformation of warfare means that new capabilities will need to be developed.

Replacing the Finnish Army's ageing equipment and materiel and sustaining its ability to contribute to NATO's collective defence require an extensive and long-term modernisation of land defence. This process is already underway. Also, the Capability Targets apportioned to Finland through the NATO Defence Planning Process will guide this development process. Sufficient, long-term resources will be ensured for the Army to complete its modernisation process.

The Finnish Navy has sustained its capability for the surveillance and protection of territorial integrity. A modernisation of Finland's **maritime defence** is underway. Once the Squadron 2020 programme is completed and the Pohjanmaa class multi-role corvettes are deployed, the Navy will have the capability of year-round sustained presence and operations at the Baltic Sea and the capability to take part in NATO's maritime operations and missions. This will support the entire defence system and the securing of sea lines of communication.

The Finnish Navy has maintained its antisurface warfare and minelaying capabilities necessary for repelling seaborne attacks. The deployment of a next-generation long-range surface-to-surface missile system is underway. The upkeep of the current main weapons systems will continue until the new capabilities reach their full operational capacity.

The command and control, mobility, and fire-support capabilities and the protection of the maritime defence forces have been developed systematically. The surface surveillance systems are being maintained. The process of modernising the underwater surveillance systems and mine countermeasures capabilities is underway.

The Finnish Navy has started the planning of the capabilities required by NATO's collective defence. However, additional resources and years of work will be needed to fully implement the NATO Capability Targets.

The operational readiness of Finland's **air defence** has been kept at the level required by the demands of the operating environment. It is part of the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence. Air operations can be conducted independently or as part of the Alliance or possible coalitions.

Air defence capabilities and cover have been improved by developing the Air Force's agile combat employment concept and by improving base structures and systems. The doctrines and capabilities of the Finnish Air Force and the ground-based air defence have been shown to be effective based on experiences from Russia's aggression against Ukraine. The procurement of multi-role combat aircraft and ground-based air-defence systems will be finalised by the end of the period of this report, constituting a technological leap that will improve Finland's multilayered and comprehensive air and missile defence capabilities. Once taken into operational use, the F-35 multi-role fighters will strengthen the operational capability of the entire Finnish defence system. The early-warning and multilayered capabilities of Finland's air defence will improve once the David's Sling system for ground-based air defence is taken into operational use and the capabilities of the

Navy's new Pohjanmaa class multi-role corvettes are fielded. The decommissioning of certain ground-based air defence systems during the period of this report will weaken the regional coverage of Finland's air defence, and these capabilities will need to be replaced by new ones.

Air threat has multiplied and changed its character. The use of ballistic and cruise missiles as well as drones has spiralled. This means that air defence needs to have advanced surveillance capabilities, new cost-efficient capabilities to repel mass use of weapons systems and readiness to protect land, maritime and air forces, joint capabilities and critical infrastructure.

The capabilities of the existing combat aircraft and ground-based air defence systems will be kept at the required level until the new systems are taken into operational use. Once the F-35 fighters are taken into operational use, the F/A-18 capabilities will be decommissioned as planned. Finland's national flight training approach meets the demands of the operating environment in the 2030s. International interest, and especially Nordic interest, in the Finnish approach to flight training may enable the organisation of multinational flight training. Its feasibility will be reviewed by the end of the decade.

The Finnish Air Force has started the planning of the capabilities required by NATO's collective defence. However, additional resources and years of work will be needed to fully implement the NATO Capability Targets.

The Finnish Defence Forces is responsible for Finland's **military cyber defence** as part of national cyber defence and NATO's cyber defence. Cyber defence capabilities, i.e. protection, intelligence and offensive cyber operations, are used to safeguard the defence system, enabling the Defence Forces to carry out its duties. Cyber defence is also used to support other public authorities.

Military cyber defence surveillance and situational awareness detect and identify threat actors and help prevent them from accessing systems and information central to the Defence Forces. The Finnish Defence Forces has developed the ability to build cyber situational awareness, to monitor and protect its systems and to plan and execute cyber operations. The process of integrating cyber defence as part of all operations is ongoing across all functions of the Defence Forces and its cooperation with public authorities and different sectors.

The modernisation of **space defence** continues as space technology-generated services are procured through joint contracts and cooperation with international partners. Space situational awareness has been improved through the EU, NATO and bilateral cooperation. At the national level, the launching of a cross-government Finnish Space Situational Awareness Centre (FSSAC) is being planned together with other relevant authorities. The availability and capabilities of commercial space services have improved rapidly. Commercial services are all the time being harnessed to support defence capability, and new opportunities are being reviewed. The Finnish defence administration continues the process of identifying the impacts of space warfare on the different functions of the defence system.

The Finnish Defence Forces has improved its competence, approach and tools regarding **information defence** capabilities to ensure its ability to identify and respond to malicious information influence activities targeting the defence system. Information defence is used to strengthen deterrence, to prepare support for the Defence Forces' operations to repel armed attacks against the territory of Finland under emergency conditions and to support the Defence Forces' own operations as part of NATO. Information defence has real-time capabilities to support situational awareness of the information environment, to protect the defence system and to launch defensive measures where necessary.

The **joint capabilities of the Finnish Defence Forces** include military intelligence, command and control, long-range fires, special operations forces, and logistics. Changes in the operating environment and the advancement of technology have created new demands on **military intelligence**, especially regarding information gathering. As information gathering is increasingly network-based, both the powers assigned under the Act on Military Intelligence and the development of intelligence capabilities have improved the Finnish Defence Forces' abilities to maintain situational awareness and give early warning for adjusting the level of readiness. The reviewing of the military intelligence legislation is ongoing. The systematic integration of the Finnish Defence Forces' military intelligence with NATO's intelligence has supplemented the Defence Forces' abilities to maintain situational awareness and give early warning. The close cooperation between military intelligence and the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service creates a firm foundation for Finnish intelligence in all situations.

The readiness of **command and control** has been enhanced to meet the demands of the changing military operating environment. Acquisitions of additional critical materiel have improved the C2 materiel security. Situational awareness cooperation has been intensified both nationally and internationally. The Finnish Defence Forces

has strengthened its cooperation with telecommunications operators and with key Allies and partners to improve interoperability. Investments in information security and cyber security have ensured the continued functioning of command and control.

The Finnish Defence Forces has made use of common government services and contributed to their development. The command and control systems of the Defence Forces have been systematically supplemented with tools and solutions that use commercial technologies. Society's infrastructure ensures the functioning of the telecommunications connections that are critical to defence, including cross-border telecommunications. Development work to find ways of using artificial intelligence to support daily work and analytics and to build the necessary data management is underway but will require additional investments.

The sustainment and development of command and control systems will take into account the effects of Finland's accession to NATO and of bilateral and multilateral international cooperation. The integration of the Finnish Defence Forces with NATO's command and control systems is underway. The planning and implementation of collective defence means that the Finnish Defence Forces will adjust its command and control structures, amend its command and control architecture and implement NATO's systems in controlled ways that safeguard information security. The Defence Forces will develop its capabilities to audit, certify and accredit data systems and encryption products together with the Finnish Transport and Communications Agency Traficom.

The Finnish Defence Forces has continued the deployment of **long-range fires** and the improvement of target acquisition capabilities in all Services. Its long-range strike capabilities against ground and surface targets include combat aircraft, multiple launch rocket systems and anti-surface missiles. The stockpiles of long-range strike munition have been backfilled.

Improvements have been made to the equipment of the **special operations forces** of the Finnish Defence Forces to keep up with developments in their tasks and the operating environment. Helicopter capabilities have been improved and made more adaptable to the needs of the special operations forces. The number of joint terminal attack controllers has been raised. The joint-operation capabilities of the special operations forces will be developed both internally within the Defence Forces and externally in collaboration with other authorities and Allies.

The current ability of the **logistics system** to sustain troops is proportionate to the needs of homeland defence only, with a focus on combat support and combat service support. The plans are in place to build the logistics capabilities required by changes in the operating environment, Finland's membership in NATO and the expanded activities of the Defence Forces, and the work is about to begin.

The logistics system's ability to sustain troops has been honed during readiness and partnership exercises, in responding to different kinds of disruptions of normal conditions and based on experiences from the delivery of materiel support to Ukraine. Finland has pursued bilateral and multilateral materiel cooperation in line with the priorities of the previous report. Supporting multinational exercises has augmented the capabilities of the logistics system to deploy and sustain troops and improved interoperability.

International and national cross-government cooperation has been intensified to enable military mobility. However, reaching the desired end state still requires considerable development and investment, for example, to streamline cross-border military activities, to improve the capabilities of host nation support, to develop logistics capabilities and to raise the dual-use and flow capacity of the transport infrastructure.

The needs to build and develop the Finnish Defence Forces' **infrastructure** have multiplied in recent years. The deterioration of the security situation coincided with an unusually extensive facilities investment package linked to the development of the Defence Forces' capabilities. At the same time, increases to materiel procurement and ammunition production require greater capacity of storage. Key infrastructure projects address the construction needs of the F-35 procurement programme, improve stockpiling and implement systematic refurbishing, renovation and new construction of military shelters and barracks. The 2020s have seen major investments in real estate maintenance and building life-cycle management. Moreover, Finland's membership in NATO and the Defence Cooperation Agreement with the United States create new demands for facilities. Investments in the Defence Forces' infrastructure will also create new jobs and boost the construction industry across the country.

The logistics system will be developed to better support homeland defence and NATO and Allies. Key elements will include the delivery and reception of international forces and extensive materiel assistance, the prepositioning of equipment and materiel, the ensuring of military medical capabilities and airlift capabilities, and the organisation of sustained logistics support.



The development of **technologies critical to defence and security** is no longer primarily governed by states. Instead, the main driver of such development is the commercial interests of the civilian sector. At the level of states, the management and harnessing of technological capabilities have become a central element of national security. The advancement of technological interests, especially regarding disruptive technologies, is also relevant for security policy.

The pace of technological advances and the effects technology has on society, conflicts and capability requirements have been enormous in the 2020s: artificial intelligence has made a breakthrough, and Russia's aggression against Ukraine is the first large-scale conflict to make mass use of remote-controlled and autonomous unmanned aircraft and vessels and other military capabilities that are based on civilian platforms and technologies.

New technologies may revolutionise both warfare and the planning and development of capabilities. Especially in the context of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the European Union has focused on developing the EU's strategic autonomy with regard to critical technologies and technology policy. Similarly, NATO has observed that technological advances are shaping societies and the future of conflict. For NATO, technology is a key element of strategic competition that enables leadership in the development of military capabilities and the maintenance of credible deterrence.

Finland's **research, development and innovation efforts** focus on remote-controlled and autonomous unmanned systems, data processing, situational awareness, quantum technology and emerging and disruptive technologies. Since the previous report, the Ministry of Defence's branch of government has become more involved in the international research, development and innovation (RDI) cooperation. Finland is participating in the implementation of NATO's research activities and innovation initiatives, for example by establishing an accelerator and two test centres for DIANA. In the EU framework, Finland is harnessing the opportunities created by the European Defence Fund for improving national RDI.

Despite various development efforts, the Finnish defence administration has only limited ability and capacity to monitor and manage technologies and make full use of international RDI instruments. These limitations are due to insufficient resources and fragmented organisation.

Several parts of the **legislation related to the Finnish defence administration** were reformed during the previous government term. For example, more flexibility was introduced into the rules on the organisation of call-ups. The provisions on military service and non-military service were amended regarding the decision-making on fitness for military service and the refusal of military service and non-military service. The rules governing the use of firearms by the Finnish Defence Forces and the Finnish Border Guard were extended with regard to voluntary national defence activities. Two new acts were enacted: the Act on Voluntary Military Service for Women and the Act on Military Vehicles. Regulation on real estate transactions subject to a licence was specified, and the need to introduce additional restrictions or bans on real estate transactions was reviewed. The rules on the participation and decision-making concerning cooperation between the Finnish Defence Forces and international partners were clarified.

Parliament of Finland accepted the North Atlantic Treaty and the Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, National Representatives and International Staff on 1 March 2023. Parliament also accepted Finland's accession to other international agreements required by Finland's membership in NATO, and the agreements were brought into force.

Finland's **accession to NATO** started an extensive project to amend the Finnish defence legislation, which so far has been based on the premise of homeland defence and military non-alignment. The duties of the Finnish Defence Forces and the Territorial Surveillance Act and related provisions are being amended to meet the demands of Finland's NATO membership. In addition, a more extensive legislative review is needed to reflect both NATO's return to a focus on deterrence and defence and the changes to the Finnish Defence Forces' main tasks. The legislation will need to enable Finland to flexibly contribute to deterrence activities and the implementation of collective defence in different kinds of situations, together with Allies in Finland and throughout the Alliance. Reviewing and harmonising the Finnish legislation, as required, to fulfil Finland's NATO commitments is a lengthy process that will continue for years to come.

The **European Union's** security and defence cooperation reinforces the defence capabilities of EU Member States and creates a foundation for a common European defence capability, thereby strengthening Finland's security. Finland continues to support the deepening of European defence cooperation that aims to make the EU more capable and a stronger global actor. Finland supports the EU's significant role in reforming Ukraine's security and defence sector and armed forces.

**Defence cooperation** supports Finland in sustaining and developing its defence capability. Finland has continued to deepen its defence policy dialogue with Allies and partners and has extended the scope of its cooperation to new sectors. It has prioritised demanding exercises, materiel cooperation, research and development, operational cooperation and information exchange.

Defence cooperation has improved the Finnish Defence Forces' competence, interoperability and situational awareness as well as the ability to provide and receive military support. It has paved the way for Finland's contribution to NATO's collective defence. Finland has deepened its bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation especially with Sweden, Norway, Estonia, the United States and the United Kingdom as well as in the framework of the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) and the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). The defence cooperation network demonstrated its effectiveness when Finland's partners strongly backed Finland's aspiration to join NATO and gave their support to Finland's security during the accession process.

Joining NATO and the deepening defence cooperation with the United States represent a fundamental shift for Finland. The Finnish defence administration has born most of the practical implications of Finland's accession to NATO. The Ministry of Defence and the Defence Forces started Finland's NATO integration in all key sectors in summer 2022. This work will continue for years to come.

The Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) between Finland and the United States is currently being implemented. The DCA supplements Finland's NATO membership and strengthens Finland's defence capability. It allows Finland to plan operations together with the United States, enables the presence of US forces and capabilities in Finland and creates the conditions for using them, if necessary, to support Finland's defence.

Finland actively demonstrates its readiness and defence capability together with NATO Allies to maintain the necessary level of deterrence. Finland's NATO membership and our deepening bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation arrangements improve our situational awareness and cooperation capabilities.

## 4 Sustainment and development of defence capability

### Statutory duties of the Finnish Defence Forces<sup>1</sup>

1. military defence of Finland
2. collective defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
3. supporting other public authorities
4. providing assistance based on Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union or participating in international aid provision, cooperation and other international activities not associated with the collective defence of NATO
5. contributing to international military crisis management operations and to military tasks in international crisis management missions.

### 4.1 Defence policy guidelines

Finnish defence will be dimensioned to meet the demands of the fundamentally deteriorated security situation, the altered strategic position of Finland and the military threats we are facing. Finland will need to sustain its capability to counter broad-spectrum influencing, resist protracted military pressure and fight large-scale wars dragging on for years. Our defence will be developed systematically as a whole entity and using a long-term perspective to make it fit for the growing demands of the operating environment, taking into account the objectives and obligations of NATO's collective defence.

Finland will implement its defence policy in a changed international operating environment where threats are diversifying, and new kinds of opportunities are emerging. During the period of this report, Finland's defence policy will focus on

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<sup>1</sup> The Government will submit to Parliament its proposal for legislation concerning the Finnish Defence Forces.

a strong national defence capability, our membership in NATO and the European Union, and our deepening bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation. Supporting Ukraine for the long term will also be essential for the security and defence of Finland.

Finland's membership in NATO has considerably raised the volume of defence policy matters. The Ministry of Defence and the Finnish Defence Forces will have a shared situational awareness of the state of play in defence policy and military matters so that Finland's national preparation and decision-making as well as the national policies concerning NATO will be coherent and in line with each other. It will be ensured that, at national level, the necessary decisions can be made quickly and seamlessly. The Finnish Defence Forces will contribute to maintaining NATO's deterrence and defence posture flexibly, and without delay, if necessary, together with our Allies and as part of the normal activities of the Alliance. To this end, Finland will review its existing decision-making processes and levels. The Ministry of Defence will prepare the NATO matters concerning its administrative branch for the Government and for the joint meetings of the President of the Republic and the Ministerial Committee on Foreign and Security Policy. It will also ensure that Parliament's right to information is realised. Where necessary, the Ministry of Defence will work together with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and other ministries.

Finland's defence policy and military role in NATO will be shaped at a time the Alliance, to strengthen its deterrence and defence, is undergoing the greatest changes since the end of the Cold War. Finland will participate in the Alliance's activities across the spectrum, having set no national restrictions on its NATO membership. The Alliance's ability to counter the threat of Russia is especially essential for Finland. We are committed to NATO's deterrence and collective defence against all threats throughout the territory of the Alliance, based on a 360-degree approach. It is Finland's national interest that NATO is strong and able to act.

NATO's deterrence consists of conventional forces and capabilities, missile defence capabilities and nuclear weapons, supplemented by space and cyber capabilities. Nuclear weapons are a key component of NATO's deterrence. Finland will participate in the work on NATO's nuclear deterrence and improve its competence and awareness of matters concerning nuclear weapons and deterrence. Credible deterrence and defence and the effective implementation of NATO's core tasks will be founded on national resilience and collective resilience.

The collective defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will be a new duty for the Finnish Defence Forces. Developments in the operating environment highlight the significance of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Finland will work to ensure that NATO is ready and able to execute its collective defence. Finland's defence capability will strengthen NATO's collective defence for the whole of the Alliance. The Finnish defence administration will create the conditions for cooperation with Allies, for the presence of NATO personnel and structures in Finland and for the reception of Allied forces in Finland to implement collective defence. If Finland, as a NATO member, became a target for the use of military force, it would defend itself with the support of NATO according to plans prepared and rehearsed in advance.

Finland will be a security provider and a constructive, reliable and capable Ally that together with other Allies will contribute to the fulfilment of all three of NATO's core tasks – deterrence and defence; crisis prevention and management; and cooperative security. Finland is committed to defending NATO's other member states. The Finnish Defence Forces will ensure that Finland has the capabilities and arrangements necessary to fulfil its obligations under Article 5.

Finland will sustain a strong national defence capability and ensure that it has sufficient resources. The key prerequisites of Finland's defence will be up-to-date legislation, sufficient resources (including competent and motivated personnel) and relevant defence materiel and infrastructure.

A system of conscription, a trained and large reserve and a strong will to defend the country will be the cornerstones of Finnish defence as a NATO Ally, too. The resilience of Finnish society is built on comprehensive-security based practices, ensuring that vital functions of society are maintained in all security situations. In accordance with the total defence approach, Finland's defence capability will continue to rely on the support of society.

The Finnish Defence Forces will support other public authorities based on executive assistance requests and cooperation arrangements. By developing its military capabilities, the Defence Forces will also be better able to assist other public authorities. The possibilities of using those liable for military service in demanding military tasks, border guard duties and executive assistance duties in different security situations will be developed further. The Defence Forces will continue to contribute to international military crisis management operations and to military tasks in international crisis management missions. It will also participate in international aid provision, cooperation and other international activities.

The Finnish defence administration will prepare to prevent and counter broad-spectrum influencing together with other security actors as part of the concept for comprehensive security and the development of total defence. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), special operations forces, cyber defence, information defence and strategic communications will be developed in national and international cooperation to improve the abilities to identify, prepare for and counter broad-spectrum influencing.

The development of Finland's national and military cyber defence will focus on securing the powers, authorities and policies that are necessary for safeguarding Finland's operating environment and national sovereignty. In addition, the cooperation, coordination and exchange of information between authorities and our participation in NATO's cyber defence and its development will be ensured.

The cross-cutting nature of information defence and the countering of information influence activities will require the ability and powers to monitor the information environment, to exchange information, to protect against influence activities as well as the capabilities to take countermeasures in the information environment across administrative boundaries and together with the private sector. The Ministry of Defence will counter information influence activities against Finland's defence capability together with the Finnish Defence Forces, Allies and different actors involved in total defence.

In developing NATO's deterrence and defence, it is important to ensure the executability of NATO's operations plans, i.e. the new Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) Family of Plans. To this end, NATO needs well-functioning command and control structures, plans, forces and capabilities so that it can undertake to defend the whole of the Allied territory.

The Nordic countries, the Baltic Sea region and the European Arctic region together form a strategic whole. From a military perspective, Finland, Sweden and Norway will make up one area of operations. The ability to flexibly work together with Allies in the Baltic Sea region will also be important. NATO's military presence and exercises in the territory of Finland will support the efficient implementation of collective defence and strengthen the ability to defend Finland successfully.

Finland takes part in the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and incorporates the Capability Targets apportioned to Finland into the Defence Forces' development programme.

To meet the demands of new duties and to advance policies that are important to Finland, the Defence Forces and the Ministry of Defence will send more personnel to NATO's structures and raise the number of personnel working on NATO matters at home. This will require more resources. The revision of the legislation concerning the Finnish Defence Forces will be continued to enable the implementation of Finland's commitments as a NATO Ally, the presence of Allied forces in Finland and the abilities of Finland to work effectively and flexibly as part of NATO's deterrence and defence.

A key priority will be to create legislative conditions and other conditions for the regular personnel of the Finnish Defence Forces and for those liable for military service to take part in NATO operations and missions outside the territory of Finland. Where necessary, the regular personnel of the Defence Forces are obligated to participate in international operations and missions outside the territory of Finland if their participation is necessary to ensure that the operation or mission has sufficient personnel and the expertise required. The Defence Forces' new personnel solution needs to allow that sufficiently trained persons, who are liable for military service, can be deployed flexibly across state borders between NATO Allies in operations and missions to defend Finland. This will include logistics support and ability for basing of the Defence Forces in neighbouring regions. Even in the future the basic rule would be that only the regular personnel of the Defence Forces and reservists that have been assigned to a wartime task are used in military defence tasks abroad. In addition, the Defence Forces will need to be able to deploy troops to collective defence tasks elsewhere in the Allied territory, if necessary.

It is important for Finland that the EU play a major role in providing the framework for European security and defence cooperation and as a provider of comprehensive security. The stronger and more unified the EU will be, the more safe and secure will be Finland's position. Finland will support the strengthening of the EU's defence policy and the broad use of the EU's tools to reinforce the security and defence capability of the EU and its Member States. European defence capability will be strengthened through the EU's defence cooperation initiatives and through the EU's legislation and budget.

NATO and the EU share a common value base and a common interest to safeguard Euro-Atlantic security and stability. Finland will promote the mutually complementary cooperation between NATO and the EU that reinforces transatlantic burden sharing. The areas of this cooperation that will be important to Finland include support to Ukraine, capability development, military security of supply,



critical infrastructure protection, military mobility, the countering of space and hybrid threats and the strengthening of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base.

Bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation will be important elements of Finland's defence capability. Bilateral cooperation will be deepened with countries important to Finland based on shared interests. A focus in the coming years will be the implementation of the Defence Cooperation Agreement between Finland and the United States. Bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation between NATO Allies will support NATO's deterrence and defence and create conditions for receiving and giving support even before invoking NATO's operations plans and Article 5.

Finland's defence cooperation will focus on countries that would play a major role in a crisis in Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea region from the perspective of Finland's defence and NATO's deterrence and defence or that are significant players in defence materiel cooperation. Finland will also engage in defence cooperation with non-NATO partners that are important to Finland.

Defence cooperation will also entail international materiel cooperation as a tool to develop the capabilities of the Finnish defence system and to boost Finland's security of supply and defence industry. The Finnish defence administration will take part in NATO's procurement cooperation, in the development of NATO's common capabilities and in research and development activities on a needs basis.

The research, development and innovation policy of the defence administration will be developed as a whole, based on national needs, to meet the changed demands of the operating environment. Global competition and accelerating technological development will be key motivators of this work. The importance of technological capabilities and technological edge as strategic resources will be evident not only in Finland but also in the EU and NATO. They will be central building blocks for up-to-date capabilities and for security of supply.

Finland will work towards the establishment of international regulations, agreements and principles for the development and use of new technologies, particularly artificial intelligence and lethal autonomous weapons systems. At the same time, opportunities for harnessing new technologies will be created to develop defence capabilities. In addition, the ways states operating outside of international agreements and other actors use disruptive technologies will be monitored, and procedures and countermeasure capabilities against threats from new technologies will be created.

The Finnish defence administration will take part in upholding and developing arms control agreements and arrangements, and it will maintain its competence and readiness to implement them.

Finland's geographical location at NATO's external border will make it even more important to ensure that Finland has sufficient defence resources far into the future. The minimum level of Finland's defence budget will need to comply with the NATO guideline for defence spending, agreed by Allies. In the Vilnius Summit, NATO Allies agreed to invest at least two per cent of their gross domestic product annually on defence. Countering the threat posed by Russia and catering for the needs of the Alliance could require raising the guideline for defence spending and greater resources already in the coming years.

All NATO Allies share the risks, responsibilities and benefits of NATO's collective defence. They are expected to invest in the Alliance's collective needs in proportion to their resources. The jointly agreed defence spending guideline is an important indicator of the commitment of individual Allies to providing security and achieving NATO's common objectives. NATO also monitors how Allies use their defence expenditure and how they contribute to operations, missions and other activities.

Concerning the use of defence spending, a key question is whether individual Allies meet the Capability Targets apportioned to them based on NATO's threat-informed overall needs. An individual Ally's failure to meet its targets will increase the risks in the implementation of collective defence. Finland and other countries on NATO's external border have a strong interest to ensure effective collective defence.

It is important for Finland that all Allies, in addition to developing their national capabilities, also invest in NATO's common capabilities to strengthen deterrence and defence. This is implemented through common funding capabilities. Finland will advocate for the development and building of NATO's common capabilities through the NATO Security Investment Programme and through NATO's other financial mechanisms.

## 4.2 Defence system integration and operation as part of NATO's deterrence and defence

NATO's military power is mainly based on the member states' national forces and capabilities, which they develop and prepare to use collectively to defend the territory of the Alliance. Finland's defence system, previously designed based on national needs, will be a firm foundation for our integration into NATO's deterrence and defence. It will be optimised to meet the requirements of our NATO membership and to make good use of the opportunities the Alliance provides.

As a NATO Ally, Finland's defence interests have extended beyond our national needs to encompass the security of the entire Alliance. Finland sustains and develops its national defence capability in all security situations, taking account of NATO's common goals. The integration of Finland's military defence into NATO's deterrence and defence will continue and deepen during the period of this report. To this end, Finland will need to take into account NATO's military strategic objectives and integrate its national capabilities and operations into NATO's activities in all operational domains. The development of the multi-domain operations (MDO) approach will continue across services and domains.

The integration of Finland's defence into NATO will coincide with a major transformation of the Alliance. NATO's primary objective will be to build a credible deterrence and to safeguard the practical arrangements for defending the whole territory of the Alliance. These objectives are in many ways similar to the long-term policies of developing Finland's defence.

It is vitally important to Finland that NATO's planning, structures and posture will enable the effective implementation of collective defence in Northern Europe and in the Baltic Sea region.

### 4.2.1 NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP)

All NATO Allies take part in the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), and they are committed to developing their national capabilities based on collectively agreed targets. The NDPP guides Finland, for example, to develop the usability of some of the Defence Forces' troops beyond its own territory in the extent defined by NATO's requirements and to improve interoperability at different levels of command. The requirements of collective defence are considerably more extensive in scale and

much more binding in nature than the requirements of the crisis management and peacekeeping operations where the Finnish Defence Forces has participated in the past.

The country-specific Capability Targets for capability development are a challenge to all member states and will require considerable additional resources from them. The needs for change arising from Finland's Capability Targets will be the greatest in the early years of our NATO membership. The necessary reforms will strengthen our national defence capability and improve our ability to operate effectively as part of NATO's deterrence and defence.

Finland will build the capabilities required by NATO's targets gradually as part of the Defence Forces' development programme and its resources. This process will take years, and additional resources will be needed. The planning and sustainment of the Defence Forces' operational and materiel readiness will consider the readiness objectives assigned to the Defence Forces. A key development need in NATO is to build more extensive land forces and to ensure combat support and combat service support at different command levels, such as indirect fire and logistics. Other key areas include, for example, air and missile defence and the countering of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats.

The raising level of NATO's overall military requirements will be reflected on the next country-specific Capability Targets, which will be confirmed for all Allies in 2025. The Finnish Defence Forces will take into account new priority areas in its capability development plans. It is important for Finland that new capability targets will be defined based on the needs identified in NATO's DDA Family of Plans and that they will consider the regional characteristics of each Ally. NATO's defence planning and its closer links to the Alliance's operations planning will support the development of Finland's national defence capability.

Forces and systems will need to be interoperable so that NATO can undertake its missions and tasks, and all Allies will need to sustain and develop their interoperability all the time. NATO standards are designed to support the attainment, sustainment and further development of interoperability. Although the Finnish Defence Forces systematically developed its interoperability with NATO when Finland was a partner, the interoperability will be extended to a larger share of the Defence Forces' troops now that Finland is an Ally. The defence administration has adopted a procedure for Finland's participation in NATO standardisation.

## NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP)

The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) is one of NATO's constantly ongoing primary means of ensuring that the Alliance can implement collective defence, if needed. The NDPP is based on the Allies' obligation under Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty to separately and jointly develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. The Capability Targets apportioned in the NDPP are binding on Allies.

The NDPP guides the maintenance and development of the military and non-military capabilities necessary to support the Alliance and its members. The main goal of the NDPP is the development and delivery of the necessary range of forces and capabilities, competence, readiness and resources to undertake the Alliance's full spectrum of missions. The NDPP provides a framework for harmonising the planning and developing of the capabilities the Alliance requires. NATO is in the process of strengthening the links between defence planning and operations planning.

Each Ally is apportioned a Capability Target package every four years. The timeframe for implementing the Targets is mainly within 7 to 19 years, but there are also Targets with a shorter timeframe. The NDPP encompasses different planning domains: defence policy and defence planning; land defence; maritime defence; air and missile defence; cyber defence; space; special operations forces; logistics and support; stabilisation and reconstruction; and resilience. Each member state is responsible for the development of the required capabilities and for allocating the necessary resources for them. NATO encourages and assesses the Allies' progress in strengthening their resilience in accordance with the Alliance's resilience objectives but without any binding capability targets.

Fair burden-sharing and reasonable challenge are the guiding principles in determining the Capability Target package of each Ally. Fair burden-sharing is based on the gross domestic product of each member state and on the size of their population and armed forces. Reasonable challenge means that the targets must be realistic and feasible considering the resources and capabilities of each member state and the time required to develop capabilities.

Allies agree the target packages for each Ally according to the principle of 'consensus minus one', meaning that an individual Ally cannot veto a decision concerning its own target package. The procedure seeks to monitor and ensure that fair burden-sharing and reasonable challenge between Allies is realised. All member states share the risks, responsibilities and benefits associated with collective defence.

#### 4.2.2 NATO's operations planning and command and control structures

NATO's Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) has two components: operations planning in defence of the Alliance and peacetime collective defence.

The territory of Finland has been assigned under Supreme Allied Commander Europe's (SACEUR) area of responsibility, and the defence of this area is planned as a whole. NATO's regional planning concerning Finland and its role in operations in SACEUR's area of responsibility builds on Finland's national operations plans. The Finnish Defence Forces has long experience of operations planning to defend the territory of Finland, which has facilitated the process of integrating Finland into NATO's regional planning. The operations plan for the territory of Finland has been part of NATO's DDA Family of Plans since 2023.

It is crucial for effective deterrence and defence that NATO has executable operations plans. This entails that the command and control structures necessary for the implementation of the plans are sufficiently resourced and capable, the forces and capabilities required are available and regularly exercised, and NATO's military officials have been delegated sufficient powers and authorities.

The DDA Family of Plans will be updated during regular cycles of planning. NATO's plans concerning the operational direction of Finland will be updated and coordinated in close cooperation between NATO, Finland and other Allies.

NATO's operational-level commands coordinate the Allies' national operations planning with their own planning and activities. The goal is that all three Joint Force Commands (JFC) are fully operational and capable to execute their tasks. It is important for Finland that in the future all Nordic countries are under the Joint Force Command Norfolk (JFC Norfolk). NATO's deterrence and defence posture will

necessitate a maximum level of coordination and cooperation between the JFCs. The Finnish defence administration will send personnel to NATO structures. It will be a priority to contribute to the Allied Command Operations (ACO), and Finland will be especially committed to shouldering its share of strengthening the JFC Norfolk.

### **4.2.3 NATO's collective peacetime activities and Allied Reaction Force**

The purpose of NATO's collective peacetime activities is to signal NATO's readiness and defence capability. They are an important element of the Alliance's essential purpose where all Allies are prepared to support each other through contributing to deterrence and defence throughout the territory of the Alliance. Deterrence is sustained, developed and demonstrated through regular exercises, operations and presence.

Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and the subsequent deterioration in the security situation in Europe have raised the significance of NATO's peacetime activities. As a result, NATO has strengthened its presence in the eastern member states. NATO's peacetime activities consist of Forward Land Forces (FLF), Standing Naval Forces (SNF) and Air Policing and Air Shielding missions. SACEUR's powers will enable raising the level of engagement where necessary, for example by increasing military presence commensurate to threats.

NATO has placed Forward Land Forces (FLF) on its eastern flank. In-place forces have been deployed in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria at the countries' request. They vary in size and capabilities because their compositions reflect geographical factors and the threat environment. Force generation is guided by military requirements. In accordance with Finland's objectives, NATO will establish a Forward Land Forces presence in Finland.

Finland is participating in NATO's collective peacetime defence activities. In 2023, the Finnish Air Force joined the Air Policing mission to keep the skies safe during the Vilnius Summit. Finland's first proper participation in NATO's peacetime activities took place in 2024 when the Defence Forces deployed a Navy vessel to the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group One in the Baltic Sea and an Air Force fighter detachment to an Air Shielding mission in Romania, Bulgaria and the Black Sea. In the early years of our membership, Finland's focus will be on the activities of the Navy and the Air Force. The possibilities of Finland joining NATO's Forward Land Forces (FLF) in other member states will be reviewed on a needs basis and possibly at a later stage.

NATO has also a new Allied Reaction Force (ARF), consisting of troops and capabilities allocated by Allies for the purpose. The ARF replaces the earlier NATO Response Force (NRF). The ARF has a high-readiness capability that can be employed in all NATO's core tasks as decided by the North Atlantic Council. Finland will prepare to participate in the ARF in the future.

#### 4.2.4 NATO presence in Finland

The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO significantly expanded the Alliance's area of responsibility in the north, calling for the establishment of NATO's land, maritime and air component commands in Northern Europe. It is important that these commands have regional expertise. In line with Finland's objectives, NATO will establish in Finland a Multi Corps Land Component Command (MCLCC) under the Joint Force Command Norfolk (JFC Norfolk). This will give the Alliance appropriate command and control arrangements in land defence, thereby supporting Finland's responsibility for the planning and implementation of the defence of its own territory, taking into account its neighbouring regions.

The presence of Forward Land Forces (FLF) to be established in Finland will strengthen deterrence and create a consistent forward defence capability at NATO's border with Russia. This presence will enable the rapid response and reinforcement by Allied forces in all security situations and their support to national forces in first response. The concept will need to allow the raising of the level of force in response to changes in the security situation and guided by operations plans, and the scaling up will need to be exercised regularly in peacetime.

Sweden will be the Framework Nation for the FLF in Finland. The Contributing Nations would be Allies that have capabilities suitable for Finland's territory and conditions as well as military and political reasons to commit to a long-term land-force presence in Finland. The deterrence and defence posture and the implementation of the FLF presence will be reviewed regularly together with Allies.

Conditions for the implementation of collective defence and for the deployment and sustainment of forces will be created regionally. Finland will develop further its cooperation cross-governmentally and together with different authorities both nationally and internationally to accommodate for the increasing level of Allied operations and exercises in the territory of Finland. Finland will enable the operations, readiness, long-term activities and presence of Allied forces in Finland.



To this end, Finland will develop military mobility and host nation support and prepare for the prepositioning of Allied materiel and equipment in Finland. The related infrastructure needs will be reviewed and developed accordingly.

Finland's geographic location is challenging and strategically significant. It is important that NATO has the required command structures, readiness and posture as well as situational awareness of the security situation and military operations in Northern Europe. This will highlight the importance of NATO's intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.

#### **4.2.5 Situational awareness and surveillance and protection of territorial integrity**

NATO's Intelligence Community consists of the intelligence functions at the NATO Headquarters and in NATO's military structures that are supported by Allies' military and civilian intelligence. The intelligence functions support NATO's political and military decision-making and its operations. The Finnish defence administration participates in the guidance and development of NATO's intelligence functions, produces assessments of military developments in the security environment and contributes to the regional planning of NATO's deterrence posture. One example of operational level intelligence cooperation is surveillance and intelligence missions in the Finnish airspace together with key Allies.

The Finnish Air Force contributes to generating NATO's recognized air picture and the Finnish Navy to exchanging and supplementing NATO's recognised maritime picture. Cooperation to form maritime situational awareness is being developed among Allies. The Finnish Defence Forces prepares for participating in cooperation in matters concerning space situational awareness.

Finland's air and missile defence is part of the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD), which consists of Allies' national capabilities and of NATO's collective capabilities. NATO IAMD comprises of a network of situational awareness and communications and information systems as well as air surveillance, anti-aircraft defence, ballistic missile and cruise missile defence, indirect fire defence and counter-unmanned aerial systems defence. It also includes sensors and defence systems placed in space, in air, on land and at sea.

The ability to surveil and protect territorial integrity is essential for a country's national sovereignty and external security. Even as a NATO Ally, Finland will maintain its national capability for the surveillance and protection of its territorial

integrity, supplemented by NATO's and Allies' capabilities. The surveillance of territorial integrity under normal conditions together with NATO and Allies will enable more versatile and effective ways of using available capabilities in the future.

#### 4.2.6 NATO's response and readiness systems

It is important that NATO can respond to rapidly evolving situations with measures that amplify deterrence and defence, such as by adjusting its military presence. NATO has response and readiness systems that enable timely political decision-making and ensure that NATO's military officials have the necessary authorities to defend the territory of the Alliance. The systems also provide a structural framework for NATO's response planning and a framework that Allies can consider in their own decision-making.

NATO has reformed its response and readiness systems to make them better fit for collective defence situations. This work has taken into account lessons learned from Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. Another objective has been to better link the systems with the development of NATO's deterrence and defence posture and its regional operations planning.

Finland will integrate NATO's response and readiness systems into national procedures and participate in the related decision making. The ongoing cross-governmental work under the lead of the Ministry of Defence to define and establish national procedures and practices will continue.

### 4.3 Defence system sustainment and development

Finland's defence system will be developed based on estimates of potential military threats to Finland. Russia will pose an incessant and protracted security threat to Europe and Finland. There is a heightened risk of an armed conflict in which Finland would be involved. Russia will rebuild and expand its military capabilities in Finland's neighbouring regions, developments in its war against Ukraine permitting. It has signalled its intention to strengthen its military capacity in its northwestern regions in response to Finland's and Sweden's accession to NATO.

Finland's defence system is defined as a functional entity of military capabilities, consisting of personnel, materiel, military infrastructure and processes and functions. It is divided into subsystems, which include intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, command and control, combat, logistics, troop production and resource planning. The Finnish Defence Forces will be responsible for developing the defence system and its military capabilities.

The primary goal of sustaining and developing the defence system is to prevent the use or threat of military force against Finland. This prevention is based on the robust homeland defence capability, which is part of NATO's deterrence. Finland's strong homeland defence capability will satisfy the obligation under Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, according to which NATO Allies must separately and jointly maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

If deterrence fails, attacks will be repelled. Finland will defend its territory, population and society with all available resources together with Allies, in accordance with the principles of total defence.

At a time of deteriorating security situation in Finland's neighbouring regions, our membership in NATO and the EU's deepening defence cooperation will open new possibilities for developing the defence system in terms of readiness, operating procedures and materiel development. Alongside national measures, readiness will be improved by developing operations planning together with NATO and by increasing Allied presence in the territory of Finland.

The Finnish defence system will need a high level of readiness and an ability to protracted warfighting. At the same time, Finland and Allies will need to maintain their technological edge both in terms of quality and quantity to avoid being drawn into an attrition warfare. Finland will develop its capabilities in accordance with the quality and quantity requirements of the NDPP, taking into account lessons learned from Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and estimates of developments in Russia's warfare. These requirements mean that Finland will need to raise the level of its self-sufficiency, deepen its collaboration with the defence industry, harness emerging and disruptive technologies and develop multinational solutions.

The defence administration closely monitors the development of the security environment and the various capabilities and takes this comprehensively into account in its long-term planning. One of the areas of this work is to examine the need for anti-personnel landmines and their deterrent effect in the Finnish conditions. This will consider findings from the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine, technological development and the current capabilities of the Defence Forces.

Once the main equipment of the Air Force and the Navy are delivered, the focus of the Defence Forces' materiel development will shift to the Army's capabilities. Given the number of Army troops and systems, this development work will go beyond individual types of equipment. The development needs will be complex and long-lasting, encompassing the whole of land defence.

The conscription system will be modernised on operational premises, in accordance with conclusions drawn from modern wars and conflicts as well as the requirements defined by NATO. All development efforts will consider changes in society and technology. Finland will need to be able to contribute to NATO tasks in a comprehensive way.

Finnish defence will be developed in all operational domains (land, maritime, air, cyberspace and space) in cooperation with Allies. The Finnish Defence Forces will be developed based on multi-domain operations (MDO), which is a comprehensive approach spanning across services and domains. During the period of the report, the Defence Forces will build a data- and network-centric command and control capability to support MDOs.

Information influence activities against Finland, our defence capability and our defence system are continuous and more complex than before. They seek both political and military gains. Hostile information influence activities by state actors make unscrupulous use of emerging technologies and influence platforms. Countering information influence activities against Finland's defence capability is part of the implementation of NATO's baseline requirements for national resilience.

The Finnish Defence Forces will need information defence capabilities that are up-to-date in terms of technology and methods as well as clear and up-to-date powers and authorities so that it can counter threats in the information dimension and execute information operations as part of the MDO approach. Finland's information defence capability together with our cyber defence capability will help Finland gain and maintain its information superiority in all domains. Information superiority will safeguard situational awareness and timely decision making in all security situations. Information influence activities against Finland's defence capability will be countered as part of total defence within the framework of different authorities' duties and powers.

The Finnish Defence Forces will research and develop unmanned, remote-controlled and autonomous systems that use new technologies and that can be deployed in diverse ways in different tasks. They will be able to monitor and acquire targets and disrupt and destroy enemy forces and facilities. Unmanned systems will be developed in a coordinated manner to ensure that they benefit all Services and public authorities, taking into account international rules and regulations. While the decision to use lethal force must always be made by a human, the appropriate level of human involvement will not in all situations require on-line communications connection if responsible behaviour is ascertained in other ways.

The Finnish military intelligence will be developed to enable early warning mechanisms and support for state leadership, to ensure the systematic and fast use of deep fires and to capitalise on the support from the Alliance. The interoperability of Finnish and Allied systems will be improved. Besides interoperability, a focus will be on combining information and sharing information among operational users. The Defence Forces' abilities to use intelligence methods in versatile ways under both normal and emergency conditions will be improved.

Having a fast and long-range strike capability will be an essential component of deterrence and defence. The high readiness and reach of long-range strike capabilities will help restrict and limit an aggressor's possibilities of conducting, commanding and sustaining operations. The Finnish Defence Forces will hone its long-range strike capabilities by improving its fires capabilities, by implementing mid-life upgrades of weapons systems, by procuring munition for long-range strike systems and by developing its target acquisition capabilities against mobile targets.

The Finnish Defence Forces will develop the joint-operation capabilities of its special operations forces both internally within the Defence Forces and externally in collaboration with other authorities and Allies. As a NATO member, Finland will ensure that the command and control structure of its special operations forces is interoperable with NATO. It must also review the organisational structure of the forces and procure additional materiel for them. The special operations forces will be made more capable to operate in demanding conditions by increasing personnel numbers and by improving the infrastructure the forces need and by procuring new materiel. A particular focus will be on developing intelligence capabilities against transportable and mobile targets.

The Finnish Defence Forces will build, protect, maintain and operate operational data systems necessary for the military operating environment. It will develop its command and control system, taking fully into account the requirements of Finland's NATO membership. Integration into NATO's command and control system and its command structure will ensure uninterrupted joint-operation capabilities. Telecommunications connections and services that ensure international compatibility will also be implemented at the level of services and combined arms and to staffs involved in international cooperation under normal conditions.

The transformation of the command and control systems will ensure a resource-efficient capacity to introduce new systems and practices in innovative and flexible ways and to engage in pre-production development. Partnerships in the branch will

be developed towards a network-centred approach. The Finnish Defence Forces will be ensured a sufficient independent capability to assess, certify and accredit data systems and encryption solutions and to arrange encryption.

The coordination of cyberspace, information and electromagnetic operations and command and control systems will improve the Finnish Defence Forces' abilities to operate in all domains in all security situations. The Finnish Defence Forces will make appropriate use of its own and its partners' cloud computing services.

The Finnish Defence Forces will develop its CBRN capabilities, taking into account national cross-government preparedness and EU-level preparedness as well as the increasing NATO commitments.

As a NATO Ally, Finland will enable the reception of Allied forces and their materiel and equipment as well as their operations in the territory of Finland. To this end, the Finnish defence administration will review the need to increase the Defence Forces' wartime strength.

Finland's most important objective will be to improve the executability of NATO's regional plans in Northern Europe together with Sweden, Norway and other Allies. The prepositioning of equipment will save time in a possible crisis especially in Northern Finland where infrastructure is scarce, and distances are long.

As NATO's land mass grew significantly with the accession of Finland and Sweden, military security of supply and infrastructure will need to be improved especially in Lapland. The significance of northern connections would be particularly marked should the sea lines of communication be disrupted in the Baltic Sea. From the perspective of military mobility, it will be essential to ensure links between Finland and ports in Norway and Sweden and to develop the logistics infrastructures and telecommunication connections in the north.

The defence system will utilise the powers and high readiness of the Finnish Border Guard in the surveillance and protection of territorial integrity. Border troops will be used in land and maritime defence duties as part of the defence system when readiness is raised. If needed, the border troops can be integrated into the Finnish Defence Forces. The Border Guard will plan and prepare its operations in cooperation with the Defence Forces. The force compositions, principles of use and defence materiel of the border troops will be developed as part of the defence system, in cooperation with the Defence Forces. This work will especially consider

readiness requirements and broad-spectrum influencing. The Finnish Border Guard and the Finnish Defence Forces will continue their cooperation in materiel procurement, taking into account the needs of homeland defence.

### 4.3.1 Land defence

The objective of land defence is to prevent ground attacks against Finland. A national capability to repel ground attacks is the foundation for a credible defence capability. The Finnish Army will develop its tactics, techniques and procedures along with Army force structure and modernise its equipment and materiel, taking into account the common goals of the Alliance. In terms of materiel, it will procure new systems and upgrade its existing equipment. The equipment and materiel procured as part of the modernisation process of land defence and their ramifications will necessitate significant financial investment and long-term commitment, starting by the end of the present decade. The modernisation process of land defence will safeguard its combat power across the country.

A key component of the long-term development of land defence is the implementation of the capability targets apportioned to Finland by NATO. To this end, command and control structures and processes and functions will be made compatible, the reception of Allied forces will be enabled and the capability to deploy and sustain the Army's forces even outside the territory of Finland will be ensured. The Finnish command and force structures will be revised to meet NATO's requirements.

Finland's land defence is a combined effort of all Services of the Finnish Defence Forces, the Finnish Defence Command and its agencies, the Finnish Border Guard and the Allies supporting Finland's land defence. In all security situations, the Finnish Army will sustain its ability to execute land defence without delay and to engage the enemy alone or together with Allies. The Army will also plan and exercise a smooth transition to collective defence in accordance with NATO's plans. It will support other public authorities in securing vital functions of society and critical infrastructure.

Finland's land combat capability is founded on intelligence collection and situational awareness that utilise modern technologies; target acquisition capabilities; layered and long-range fires; force structure that enables territorial coverage; mobility; and command and control systems that enable decision-making faster than the adversary. A capable supply system will sustain the ability to conduct protracted combat operations across the country, in Finland's

neighbouring regions and, where necessary, throughout the Alliance. The land-defence systems, processes and functions will form a network with the overall defence system, enabling the integration of air-land battle and land defence.

The Finnish Army's striking capability is based on mobility and firepower. The Army consists of local forces and operational forces. These forces will be equipped based on the characteristics of their tasks. Land defence will be modernised bearing in mind the immediate development needs created by the changed operating environment and long-term improvements.

The protection of the Army's command and control systems will be amplified by developing the troops and systems of intelligence, monitoring, control and cyber operations. The Finnish Army will continue to build and introduce both NATO-integrated and bilateral and multilateral command and control systems.

Materiel will be procured for artillery, infantry, ground-based air defence and unmanned aviation to improve the Army's ability to effect. During the period of the report, the Army will decide on the replacement of the towed light artillery units that are at the end of their life cycle. The firepower of the artillery will be improved bearing in mind the requirements the operating environment places on long-range fires, on the provision of close support for troops in battle and on the ability to locate the enemy's firing units.

The firepower and mobility of the infantry will be modernised by replacing the ageing armoured infantry combat vehicles and by raising the number of combat vehicles as required by threat environment and collective defence commitments. A process to modernise the Army's firearms will be started during the period of the report. Its extent will be decided at a later stage. Mid-life upgrades of the main battle tank fleet will sustain the Army's operational counterattack capability. The range and quantity of anti-tank weapons will be increased. The mobility and protection of the Army will be improved by procuring more armoured personnel carriers and by ensuring the mobility of forces in the north.

The ground-based air defence system (GBAD) of the Finnish Army will be developed by modernising the GBAD units of the operational and local forces and by procuring force protection systems.

The engineer troops' ability to wide wet gap crossing will be safeguarded by renewing the equipment of the pontoon companies and the equipment designed to advance the mobility of mechanised troops. Heavy working machinery will also be procured. Protection materiel will be renewed to safeguard protection against



chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats. The ability of the engineers to advance the mobility of troops will be improved by procuring bridge and mine clearance equipment.

Protective equipment and night vision devices will be procured for fighters to improve combat power. In addition, the Army will procure armoured high-mobility terrain vehicles to ensure that troops reach combat and get replenishments. More fortifications and other protective facilities will be constructed under normal conditions to prevent military crises and conflicts and to improve defence capability.

Materiel readiness will be maintained at a level that ensures the combat capability of the Finnish Army. Sufficient support for mobilisation will be ensured and the ability for host nation support will be safeguarded both bilaterally and as part of the Alliance. To this end, the Finnish Army units' facilities and infrastructure will be developed, and its human resources increased. The readiness of the land defence supply system and the Defence Forces' logistics for protracted military crises will be ensured with sufficient prepositioning of equipment and materiel. To secure sufficient and timely support to the Finnish Army in battle, the capabilities of the logistics troops will be strengthened by ensuring them the capabilities to replenish and transport supplies and fuels, the necessary battlefield medicine supplies and equipment maintenance supplies and the command and control and signal solutions that support the logistics command and control system.

#### 4.3.2 Maritime defence

Finnish maritime defence will safeguard Finland's territorial integrity, the Alliance's sea lines of communication and the freedom of action in the Baltic Sea. Together with Allies, Finnish maritime defence will deny the enemy's freedom of action and repel any seaborne attacks in the Baltic Sea.

Finland's maritime defence capability builds on comprehensive maritime domain awareness and survivable recognised maritime picture and command and control. Maritime defence will need access to survivable and mobile forces with high firepower that operate in dispersed formations but may engage targets together.

Sea lines of communication will retain their vital importance for security of supply and military security both in Finland and throughout the Alliance, Finland being part of the global logistics system. Collective arrangements will be necessary for Finnish maritime defence to prepare for the threat of malign influence activities against freedom of navigation and critical maritime infrastructure.

Finnish maritime defence will need an ability to operate across domains together with other Services, the Finnish Border Guard, other Finnish authorities and actors as well as Allies. Finland and Allies will build a network of surveillance and engagement systems in the Baltic Sea region, sustained by authenticated arrangements of command and control and logistics. Maritime logistics support will be developed to enable year-round activities.

The ability to adjust readiness rapidly and flexibly will remain important for maritime defence even in future. It will enable the Finnish maritime defence to demonstrate its deterrence capability and, where necessary, counteract in a timely manner in the Baltic Sea region. The Baltic Sea region will become more important for the defence of Finland and NATO, and our goal is to uphold freedom of action in all security situations.

The Finnish maritime defence's capabilities for long-lasting surveillance in the open sea and archipelago on, above and below the surface will be safeguarded in all security situations. The intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition capabilities of maritime defence forces will be kept up to date, and requisite command and control capabilities will be ensured. Long-range and multi-directional capabilities will be needed if freedom of action is contested.

Pohjanmaa class vessels will be deployed and utilised in full as part of the overall defence system, especially with regard to intelligence, surveillance and firepower. The fielding of new capabilities will be matched with the controlled decommissioning of ageing capabilities. Using unmanned systems on, above and below surface will be essential for maritime defence.

The firepower of coastal troops and their surveillance, protection and mobility capabilities will be improved to make them capable of repelling seaborne attacks and of protecting targets as part of collective defence arrangements. The Finnish Navy will preserve its edge in naval minelaying expertise and technology. It will sustain its mine countermeasures capabilities by procuring up-to-date clearance capabilities and by upgrading its Katanpää class vessels. The Navy's unit infrastructure and human resources will be developed to safeguard readiness and the upholding of national and international commitments in maritime defence.

Keeping Finland's maritime defence capability fit for the demands of the operating environment in the 2030s will mean that decisions must be made during the period of the report on how to replace the Navy's ageing capabilities. This will especially concern the Hamina-class fast missile attack craft and the Pansio class minelayers.

### 4.3.3 Air and missile defence

The goal of Finland's air and missile defence is to prevent and repel airborne attacks. The high readiness of air and missile defence forces enables them to repel airborne attacks and to participate in land and maritime defence together with national and Allied forces. Air and missile defence maintains and develops both procedures and material. Priority is to further develop and upgrade NATO's Integrated Air and Missile Defence in Northern Europe. The Finnish Air Force is responsible for planning, coordinating and commanding air and missile defence together with Allies. Air defence and its modernisation is a collective effort of the Finnish Defence system and of the whole society when it comes to passive protection.

The Finnish Air Force's and air defence's level of material readiness necessary for sustaining combat capability and their resources for rapid mobilisation must be secured together with the operating capability in NATO's collective peacetime activities and the ability to provide host nation support bilaterally and as part of the Alliance. To this end, the Air Force Wing infrastructure and the Air Force human resources must be further developed, in addition to the critical infrastructure and human resources improvements that are made in the Finnish Air Force's F-35 programme.

F-35 fighters and the David's Sling system that support the overall defence system will be introduced to service during the period of this report. During the transition to these new capabilities, the operational capability of Finnish air and missile defence will be secured by ensuring the sufficiency of personnel, infrastructure and other resources. Capitalising the new capabilities will require the development of command and control and communications networks, in addition to exploiting automation and artificial intelligence.

The Finnish Air Force maintains and distributes recognised air picture (RAP) of Finland's neighbouring regions and regulates readiness to act in all domains. The capability to maintain recognised air picture will be ensured by fully replacing decommissioned air surveillance capabilities. The changing operational environment and NATO requirements will be taken into account. The goal is to

increase air surveillance detection range and low altitude detection capability, low observable target detection capability and improve detection and tracking of ballistic missiles. Finland's future air surveillance system will exploit active and passive sensor information from all the services. In addition, NATO and partner information will be exploited. Moreover, the ability to form military space situational awareness in cross-government cooperation will be developed during the period of this report.

The reach of Finland's ground-based air defence (GBAD) will be expanded, new layers will be added to it and target acquisition capabilities will be upgraded during the period of this report to meet the operational demands of the 2030s. Capabilities to counter small drones will be further developed. In addition, the ability of GBAD to support joint battle will be secured. GBAD capability to protect against threat missiles and other airborne projectiles will be improved.

The development activities of the Finnish ground-based air defence are vital because systems reaching the end of life-cycle must be replaced and new airborne threats must be met in a comprehensive way. Development efforts will pay attention to the need to protect both the Finnish Defence Forces' functions and the critical infrastructure of society.

The Finnish Air Force will develop the networked command and control (C2) concept and C2 systems at national and Nordic levels and as part of the Alliance. This development will contribute to the building of a comprehensive C2 approach that enables combined Nordic air operations.

The survivability of Finland's air and missile defence will be improved by developing the Air Force's agile combat employment concept and the passive and active protection and damage repair capabilities of air bases. The infrastructure, equipment and force structure of the Air Force will be modernised to enable the use of Allied air and missile defence capabilities in Finland's territory. Simultaneously, the use of Finland's air and defence capabilities in NATO operations outside of Finland will be made possible. The nationwide airbase network will be developed based on the Finnish and Alliance needs. The airbase network is dependent on the maintenance and development of civilian airports, airfields and road transport infrastructure. All the main bases of the Finnish Air Force will be developed gradually to meet NATO requirements.

The flight training system of the Finnish Air Force will be reviewed by the end of the decade to find the optimal approach to national flight training. The renewal of the advanced and tactical flight training aircraft and the potential introduction of an international flight training system will be topical by the mid-2030s. The force structure and force generation plan of the Air Force will be updated to meet F-35 operation and NATO readiness and mission requirements.

#### 4.3.4 Cyber defence

By developing national and military cyber defence, Finland will safeguard its independence and the safety and security of its people and guarantee its defence capability against cyber threats and cyber disruptions in all security situations, especially when they are orchestrated by state actors.

Military cyber defence will be enhanced to ensure the Finnish Defence Forces' ability to safeguard Finland's sovereignty in the cyber domain. This will also protect systems that directly impact defence capability against cyber threats (mission vital or critical infrastructure). The Finnish Defence Forces will be able to initiate defensive cyber operations and other countermeasures in pre-emptive ways. Finland's cyber operations must be able to support the Defence Forces in the execution of its duties in all security situations.

Cyber threats will be detected and changes in the cyber environment will be monitored in real time. Cyber defence will be developed as part of the evolving local defence system to protect the systems that directly impact defence capability. To this end, using conscripts, reservists and volunteers in cyber defence duties will be enabled more widely.

State sovereignty in the cyber environment will be defined and protected. To this end, practices and relevant legislation will be revised. Finland will draw up a cyber defence doctrine that will describe the strategic tasks and practices needed to ensure national cyber defence. These will be coordinated with NATO's cyber defence.

Established cooperation with NATO's political, military and technical levels and with different national authorities will be necessary to ensure preparedness and response against cyber threats. Finland will continue to take part in NATO's Virtual Cyber Incident Support Capability (VCISC). It allows Allies to support member states that are facing malicious cyber activities. Lending support to Allies will also reinforce Finland's defence as it will improve Finland's preparedness and

pre-emptive response against potential threats. Finland will develop cyber defence as an Ally as well as by deepening bilateral and multilateral operational cooperation with the most important Allies and partners. NATO and the EU have mutually complementary capabilities against cyber threats.

Improving situational awareness in cyber defence and countering cyber threats require the development of information exchange, jurisdiction, cooperation frameworks between national officials and the private sector. To ensure effective cyber defence, it will be necessary to review the Finnish Defence Forces' jurisdiction to gather and receive information as well as relevant reporting obligations and authorities. This concerns especially situations where state actors or their proxies conduct malicious activities below the threshold of armed conflict in the cyber domain.

Finnish legislation will be updated to safeguard the authorities' ability to support each other and to enhance the preparedness and resilience of actors critical to defence capability, security of supply and the functioning of society. A permanent cooperation framework will be created for competent cyber security authorities to ensure national cyber security. It will reflect NATO's three levels of cyber defence (political, military and technical), the EU's cybersecurity legislation and cyber defence policy as well as national coordination on information security, crime prevention and foreign and security policy. The framework will enable shared situational awareness, situation assessment, decision-making, inter-agency cyber operations and other measures based on the jurisdiction and authorities of the most appropriate authority at a given time.

The changed operating environment, Finland's military alliance and our deeper international cooperation will impact the cyber defence resources necessary and create needs to develop our cyber defence capabilities. The command and control of cyber defence and its integration with military and intelligence operations will require a review of the command and control structure in cyber defence. This will also develop Finland's ability to provide Allies and partners support in cyber defence and receive such support ourselves.

#### 4.3.5 Space defence

Space is a rapidly evolving military domain. Its role will grow in our own operations and in those of our adversaries. It will be necessary to prepare for hostile activities in and from space. The military use of space has three dimensions: satellite services, space operations and domain awareness. From the perspective of Finnish

defence, it will be important to harness satellite services in various ways, including intelligence, surveillance, targeting, data transfer, and geospatial, temporal and navigation data. A related capability will be the ability to operate in situations where an adversary intentionally seeks to deny or impair access to geospatial, temporal and navigation data. Space domain awareness will be maintained by monitoring space weather and by developing a system of space situational awareness. Attention will also be paid to the situational overview of space-system cybersecurity and data transfer, among others.

The Finnish defence administration's activities in space will strive to identify space threats, to protect the defence system against any threats and to protect and verify space systems and services. Its ability to consider space and its impacts on operations will be developed on a broad scale. Additional resources will be needed for the integration of space defence into the overall defence system. The Finnish Defence Forces will enhance the competence and understanding of all personnel concerning space activities and the significance of space in all operational domains. The Finnish defence administration will draw up a space strategy for defence, outlining developments in the space domain and specifying the defence administration's objectives, priorities and necessary measures in space.

During the period of this report, the development of space defence will focus on satellite services acquired in cooperation with Allies and partners, space situational awareness, space defence planning and the development of space defence direction. The Finnish Defence Forces will develop its ability to maintain a 24-hour situational awareness in cooperation with other Finnish authorities, international partners and Allies. The Finnish Air Force will continue to build this capability.

Finland will participate in NATO's Alliance Persistent Surveillance from Space (APSS) project, which aims to improve NATO's satellite intelligence capabilities. Our involvement in other NATO projects to develop space capabilities will be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Finland will make the most efficient use of the EU's space capabilities. The Finnish Defence Forces will look for opportunities to develop capabilities together with Allies and partners, taking into account opportunities for joint procurement and other agreement arrangements.

The importance of safe and resilient satellite connections will grow for command and control capabilities and for the functioning of modern weapons systems. The Finnish Defence Forces will ensure the usability of the satellite-based command and communication links it needs, considering Finland's northern location and interoperability with Allies and partners.

Different sectors of space activities will utilise commercial space services that are constantly evolving and increasing in number. The Finnish Defence Forces will use its own systems to verify space products and speed up users' access to space data. It will deepen cooperation with companies and continuously assess the potential of emerging technologies and services.

#### 4.3.6 Enablement

Changes in the security environment, Finland's membership in NATO and the Defence Cooperation Agreement between Finland and the United States will set growing demands on national logistics and capabilities. The Finnish Defence Forces will continue to develop the readiness and capabilities of its logistics system as part of NATO logistics. Host nations will be expected to enable extensive support. To meet the new demands, the Defence Forces will strengthen total defence as part of comprehensive security, develop the capabilities and command of the logistics system and safeguard sufficient human resources for logistics. This will emphasise the importance of having sufficient telecommunications-network capacity and reliability in and from Finland.

Development efforts will focus on military mobility, host nation support, medical support, the troops and capabilities of the Finnish Defence Forces Logistics Command, and the Nordic Joint Logistics Support Network.

The development of national and regional military mobility will need to continue urgently, for example, to streamline procedures for cross-border military activities and to ensure the dual-use and flow capacity of transport systems. The dual-use and flow capacity of road and rail connections and logistics nodes will be developed especially in Northern Finland.

The capabilities to support mobilisation and disperse materiel will be safeguarded. To ensure sustainability in the north, the development needs of the Defence Forces' logistics troop composition and command and control will be reviewed. The Nordic Joint Logistics Support Network will be developed to support homeland defence and NATO and Allied operations.

The network will enable force projection and sustainment of a combat power into, across and from Finland and the reception of extensive materiel assistance. Developing the network will also strengthen society's security of supply and military security of supply.




Among the development needs of the Nordic Joint Logistics Support Network will be military mobility and host nation support, reception, staging and onward movement (RSOM), flexible sustainment, fuel logistics, explosives storages and replenishments, and medical support. The capability to receive extensive materiel assistance will be developed in multinational cooperation. Investments to the network will be carried out in cooperation with other branches of government, making use of national financial mechanisms and the mechanisms of the EU, NATO and partners.

The Finnish Defence Forces' capability to store, transport and distribute fuels will be improved by means of national and multinational arrangements. The Defence Forces' storage capacity will be supplemented with capacity acquired from partners. Explosives stores will be built to accommodate any additional procurement of explosives and any storage needs of Allied forces. National regulations and legislation governing the storage of explosives will be reviewed and where necessary updated and adapted in accordance with NATO's and partners' requirements.

Sustaining homeland defence and NATO and Allied forces will require the harnessing of civilian component transports and the development of Nordic military transport capabilities. The military component's capability of heavy land transport will be strengthened, and maritime logistics capabilities will be safeguarded. The air transport (AT) capability of the military component will be reviewed by comparing the risks and benefits of building international and national partnerships. The military component's heavy AT capability will be safeguarded through international cooperation and agreements. The Finnish Defence Forces will evaluate the benefits of replacing its light AT capability with a medium AT capability based on an estimate of necessary investments and operating costs.

Finland will improve its capacity to enable the prepositioning of Allied equipment and materiel in the territory of Finland. The Finnish Defence Forces will assess its storage solutions as a regional whole together with other Nordic countries and within the framework of the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO). The assessment will observe the requirements of operations planning and security regulations.

Medical support and related legislation will be developed together with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and through multinational cooperation. Medical support capability during emergencies will be safeguarded. The provision of care and treatment by multinational medical support professionals and the multinational use of medical supplies and medicines will be enabled.

**Figure 3.** Enablement

## 4.4 Conscription and voluntary national defence

General conscription and a strong will to defend the country will be the foundations of Finland's defence even in future. The conscription system will produce an extensive, well-trained and capable reserve that enables the defence of the whole country, even as part of NATO. Conscription and voluntary national defence will play a significant role in the recruitment of regular personnel to the Finnish Defence Forces. The skills acquired during military service and refresher training will be useful even in other crises that threaten the functioning of society. The current conscription system still enjoys the strong support of the Finnish people.

As the age groups become smaller and the gap in the population's mental and physical abilities widens, the number of males called up for military service decreases. To counteract this, it will be necessary to raise the proportion of call-up candidates who enter military service, encourage more women to sign up for voluntary military service and reduce the drop-out rate in military service. Key means of achieving these goals will be a rewarding and safe military service of high quality and well-timed and well-constructed communications to increase awareness of conscription. Raising the number of women in military service will deepen the societal impact of homeland defence and boost the will to defend the country and increase women's involvement in military defence. Promotion of gender equality and non-discrimination is important also in the longer term to maintain the citizens' support to conscription.

In 2021, a parliamentary committee outlined that the conscription system reform should create more opportunities and ways to better distribute the responsibility for homeland defence across the age group. The conscription system will be reformed, and the call-ups will be extended to the entire age group, as proposed in the parliamentary committee's report. Cross-government cooperation and long-term commitment will be needed to achieve the objectives of the call-up reform.

Women will be encouraged to sign up for voluntary military service not only through the reforming the call-up system but also by improving communications and by highlighting the benefits of the service for later studies in the form of credit transfers and even career choices. The needs to develop the mental and physical abilities of individuals will be taken into account in the call-ups and in the service arrangements and tasks. Workload will be raised gradually, and training will be designed to support individuals in building their abilities comprehensively. The benefits of digitalisation will be exploited to the full both in terms of electronic services and training. The process of developing the financial benefits for conscripts and reservists will continue.

According to the Constitution of Finland, the homeland defence obligation includes military defence and all other activities that safeguard people's living conditions and the Government's freedom of action and defend the legal social order against an armed attack, or a similar external threat targeted at Finland. The system of non-military service will be developed to make it more relevant by creating clearer links between the service and the concept for comprehensive security. This will also benefit total defence. The goal will be to strengthen and maintain people's will to defend the country irrespective of their chosen form of service to promote a sense of equality, taking into account that the choice of non-military service is based on the individual's beliefs. In the future, the work service component of non-military training will consist of auxiliary tasks that support society's preparedness and readiness and that are central to comprehensive security.

The Finnish legislation will be amended to allow military service to take place abroad so that it will be easier for conscripts to participate in international exercises. Accordingly, the legislation will be updated to allow conscripts to do parts of their military service outside the territory of Finland. At home, conscripts and reservists will be to a larger extent assigned to tasks supporting NATO forces. The Finnish Defence Forces will also examine the possibilities of increasing cooperation between its conscript units and international forces visiting Finland. The teaching materials of conscripts' security policy studies have been updated following Finland's accession to NATO, and the curriculum for leadership training will be reviewed in 2025.

Conscripts and reservists will be encouraged to voluntarily engage themselves for NATO's deterrence and defence tasks on a contract basis. Participation in such tasks would be obligatory for the reservists after they have, on a voluntary basis, entered an engagement contract. The Finnish Defence Forces will improve its overview of the reservists' competence and introduce more flexible ways of using that competence in homeland defence tasks.

Voluntary national defence training will be key resource as it uplifts the will to defend the country. This training will be adapted to the effects of Finland's membership in NATO, and more opportunities for participation will be created both for those who are liable for military service and for those who are not. The Ministry of Defence has appointed a working group to develop the voluntary national defence system and tasked it to prepare a vision for voluntary national defence. The group will consider a variety of themes affecting voluntary national defence, such as the role of the National Defence Training Association of Finland (MPK) in the training of local units, the training and force formation of local units, the MPK's tasks under emergencies, the training responsibility in terms of comprehensive security,

effects of NATO on voluntary national defence, and the need to develop the related legislation. Operational and legislative reforms will be prepared based on the working group's report.

## 4.5 Total defence as part of comprehensive security

The resilience of Finnish society is based on the concept for comprehensive security, consisting of seven vital functions: management of government affairs; international and EU activities; defence capability; internal security; economy, infrastructure and security of supply; services and the functional capacity of the population; and psychological resilience. Vital functions of society will be safeguarded in a collaboration between the public authorities, companies, organisations and individuals. Wide engagement in preparedness will improve society's resilience. Vital functions of society will be secured in all security situations using integrated measures of preparedness and response. Preparedness will also need to consider the potential consequences of damage to vital functions and critical infrastructure.

Security of supply is part of the foundation of comprehensive security. It will ensure the continuity of the functions, economic activity, services and infrastructure critical to the economy, homeland defence and people's livelihood both in major incidents under emergency conditions and in emergency conditions.

Each ministry guides, oversees and coordinates comprehensive security preparedness in their respective branch of government. The network of comprehensive security includes central government, regional government, local government, public authorities, business and industry as well as the higher education institutions, research institutes, civil society organisations, other associations and individuals included in the network of comprehensive security. The ability of the Finnish Defence Forces to support other authorities and critical actors is safeguarded as part of comprehensive security.

The most serious threat against Finnish society is war. This accentuates the importance of defence capability. Homeland defence relies on the support of all society's sectors and on a strong will to defend the country.

Total defence is a combination of all national and international military and civilian efforts to secure the conditions of homeland defence in all security situations. With Finland's membership in NATO, total defence support will need to be extended beyond the Defence Forces' troops to Allied forces operating in the territory of Finland.

In terms of total defence, an important element of preparedness plans will be to ensure that the enablers of homeland defence are considered in activities such as law drafting, infrastructure development, policies and international cooperation already during normal conditions. The security of supply system will be a central means of promoting the objectives of total defence. It will ensure the continuity of industrial production during crises and promote the Finnish Defence Forces' access to necessary non-military capabilities both in major incidents under emergency conditions and in emergency conditions.

Strong deterrence and defence will require preparedness built in line with total defence and its closer coordination. In the post-Cold War era, there was more focus on the management of incidents under normal conditions, leading in the early 2000s to preparedness based on a broad range of threats. Developments in the operating environment, lessons learned from Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and Finland's membership in NATO will make preparedness against a military threat the basis of all preparedness in Finland. Large-scale, protracted and high-intensity warfighting has returned to the European continent. Finland's military preparedness and civil defence are based on shared threat scenarios. Strong societal ability to protect the civilian population and the critical infrastructure against the effects of weapons will contribute to the continuity of the enablers of military defence.

Finland's total defence will be developed on a threat-informed basis, considering the changing operating environment and our NATO commitments. For this reason, it will be important to systematically review the available preparedness resources in society and their allocation from the perspective of total defence. It will be essential to have a shared understanding in society of the needs of homeland defence and of the resources and their allocation necessary in times of military conflict or war.

In a military conflict, society's resources would be primarily channelled to homeland defence. It would be the only way to safeguard Finland's sovereignty and the living conditions and security of the Finnish people against an external threat from state or non-state actors. At the same time, the basic functions of society would be maintained at a level appropriate for the prevailing circumstances in accordance

with the concept for comprehensive security. Each branch of government will be responsible for preparing for emergency conditions within their remit. Preparedness will also enable response to less severe threats and incidents.

Preparedness for a military threat – especially the Finnish Defence Forces's operations planning – will create the quantitative and qualitative basis for other authorities' and sectors' preparedness in the defence of Finland. The development of total defence will consider the requirements set by NATO's operations planning and defence planning and by defence cooperation. To this end, international cooperation in total defence will be increased especially among the Nordic countries and with the United States.

The coordination of total defence falls within the purview of the Ministry of Defence. This coordination is possible under the current legislation despite the changes in the operating environment. However, it will be necessary to further specify the support needs of homeland defence. Total defence will affect a wide range of administrative branches even in future. Its coordination will be discussed in a cross-government composition under the lead of the Ministry of Defence.

## 4.6 Defence dimension of the European Union

The European Union's significance for Finland's foreign, security and defence policy will increase. It is essential that the EU is strong and capable. Finland will continue to support the development of the EU's defence dimension to strengthen the EU's geopolitical role and capabilities. European defence capability can be developed by making use of the EU's defence cooperation initiatives and the EU's wider toolbox, which includes legislation, budget and the mutual defence clause (Article 42.7 of the Treaty of the European Union).

Finland will promote the implementation of the EU's Strategic Compass and the development of the EU's activities especially in the cyber domain, space domain and the maritime dimension. Our focus will be on the EU's readiness to counter malicious hybrid influence activities and continue its table-top and scenario-based exercises for crises. More investments will be needed to safeguard critical infrastructure, develop capabilities and raise the level of defence spending.

In Finland's view, it will be important to develop the EU's preparedness policy to better include both civilian and military sectors. Finland will emphasise the need to strengthen the EU's comprehensive preparedness for possible future crises and hybrid threats. It will be important to promote the concept for comprehensive

security and the associated security of supply measures in EU Member States, too. In the EU, Finland will advocate an approach where preparedness is reinforced in coordinated ways across all policy sectors.

It will be important to strengthen the EU's strategic autonomy in security and defence and to reduce harmful dependencies. This will ensure the EU's ability to act in crises and strengthen the EU as a partner that does its share for the transatlantic security. The security and defence dialogue between the EU and the United States will be deepened. This cooperation will focus on delivering the security commitments given to Ukraine, reinforcing European defence and responding to the threat of Russia and the challenge of China. The EU will need to build a stronger framework for defence cooperation even with other key non-EU partners.

The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) will continue to be an important mechanism for the development of national and European capabilities. Finland will implement the binding PESCO commitments. Important areas of this cooperation will include military security of supply, critical infrastructure protection, military mobility, the countering of space and hybrid threats and the strengthening of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base and production. Finland will invest in promoting the EU's and NATO's capabilities in the north. In this context, PESCO will be employed to develop capabilities fit for the conditions in the north.

In the EU, Finland will advocate the use of military and civilian crisis management and the European Peace Facility (EPF) to support Ukraine and other partner nations. The EU will need structures and tools that enable its independent action in crises. In addition to developing structures that support crisis management, such as the command structures of the EU's military missions and operations, efforts must be directed at improving the activities and decision-making of the Council of the EU to reflect the changed security environment and support the EU's stronger role in the defence sector.

Finland's primary goal will be to strengthen EU funding and other incentives that support defence. To reinforce the defence industry, Finland will advocate for a stronger role for the European Defence Fund (EDF). Finland will exert influence to ensure sufficient and long-term EU-funding for military mobility and a possibility to apply for long-term EU funding to develop infrastructure even outside the Trans-European Transport Network when it is vital for military mobility and to improve dual-use capabilities. More research and development funding will need to be allocated to technologies that have dual-use potential. Finland will advocate a



system where the financing base of the common costs of the EU's military crisis management operations and missions is expanded by distributing the burden more evenly among the Member States.

The efficient development of European capabilities will require a well-functioning and competitive European Defence Technological and Industrial Base. It is important for Finland that the EU promotes the development of capabilities, for example, by strengthening the industrial operating environment.

From the Finnish point of view, the EU defence industry policy will bring significant added value to our support for RDI cooperation with industry. Finland will support initiatives to increase EU funding for the research and development of future defence technologies. In the EU defence industry policy, close attention will be paid to the impacts the European Commission's various initiatives and instruments have on Finland's defence technological and industrial base. Another goal will be to safeguard Finland's military security of supply. Finland will implement EU-level targets in ways that support the national security of supply system and other key policies concerning the defence industry.

During the EU's current multiannual financial framework, the most important financing instrument for Finland's defence industry will be the European Defence Fund (EDF). The EDF can be used to improve the long-term competitiveness and capability of the Finnish and European defence industry and research community. The Finnish defence administration will continue to be active in preparing the EDF's annual work programmes and the funded projects.

In Finland's view, the European Defence Agency (EDA) will continue to be a forum for EU Member States' cooperation in defence-sector research, technology and capability development. In addition, the EDA will support EU cooperation when it comes to military capability priorities agreed by Member States and enable the integration of military aspects into other EU policies.

Finland will be actively involved in the consideration of the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and the proposal for the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP). In the development of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), Finland will prioritise RDI cooperation, security of supply, Member States' role in capability planning and making full use of existing initiatives. Finland and like-minded EU Member States will exert influence on the implementation of new financial instruments and proposals for measures.

It will be important that the EU and its Member States continue their support to Ukraine and add to that support through the European Peace Facility and the European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) Ukraine. Finland promotes the EU's strong role and long-term commitment to supporting Ukraine. Finland will contribute to the implementation of the EU's security commitments to Ukraine. The training and other assistance provided by the EU and its Member States to Ukraine will continue to play a major role in the modernisation of Ukraine's defence sector and armed forces.

When it comes to supporting European security, NATO and the EU will have roles that complement and strengthen each other. In Finland's view, it will be important to promote the cooperation between the EU and NATO in pragmatic ways that strengthen European security and defence and benefits both parties. Closer cooperation will be needed in several areas, such as intelligence, situational awareness, cyber defence, innovations, military mobility, capability cooperation and exercises.

## 4.7 Defence cooperation

Finland will continue to strengthen its international defence cooperation. Different kinds of defence cooperation arrangements will complement each other. Finland's membership in NATO will affect the form and priorities of our defence cooperation. Becoming an Ally created preconditions to deepen and expand our bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation especially with other NATO member states through collective operations planning, among others. Finland's commitment to the security and defence of NATO Allies will affect our bilateral defence cooperation.

The bilateral and multilateral cooperation will focus on countries that are the most relevant for the defence of Finland and its neighbouring regions. In particular, Finland will work together with the Allies that are under the same Joint Force Command as Finland and with Allies in the Baltic Sea region to develop interoperability and necessary capabilities. One key objective will be to build an ability to effectively implement NATO's collective defence in Northern Europe, taking into account operational requirements and cost-efficiency. Another goal will be to ensure the ability to operate in smaller units in different kinds of crises.

Finland will also pursue bilateral and multilateral cooperation with other Allies who are relevant for Finland's defence and who, in terms of NATO's deterrence and defence, would play significant roles in a crisis in Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea region as well as with partners whose role is particularly strong in defence materiel cooperation, cyber defence or space defence.

Finland will have an extensive network of bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation. Many of the existing key defence cooperation documents were drawn up or updated after 2014, but before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and Finland's accession to NATO in 2023. The Finnish defence administration will re-examine these documents from the perspective of our membership in NATO and assess the need to update the existing defence cooperation agreements or to enter into new ones.

#### **4.7.1 Multilateral defence cooperation**

The increasing convergence of the Nordic defence concepts will be a significant change. The Nordic countries are committed to defending each other as NATO Allies. The accession of Finland and Sweden created a strong and coherent area for NATO in the north, bolstering NATO's deterrence and defence in Northern Europe. This will be reflected on the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) and its vision, objectives, priorities, fields of cooperation, activities and planning, and its efforts to improve Nordic interoperability and structures.

With all Nordic countries as Allies, their defence cooperation strives to develop the Nordic countries' abilities to execute Nordic and Allied joint operations in all security situations and in all domains. Nordic operations planning and coordination will support NATO's operations planning and the implementation of its regional plans. Earlier trilateral cooperation efforts between Finland, Sweden and Norway and between Norway, Denmark and Sweden have been incorporated into NORDEFCO. The Nordic countries' abilities to work together seamlessly will be improved through increased cooperation in exercises, military mobility, capabilities, defence materiel and total defence. In addition, the Nordic countries will strive to improve the region's military security of supply by strengthening the industrial base, for example.

The Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), led by the United Kingdom, is an important multilateral framework for defence cooperation for Finland. Its strength lies in its flexibility. Finland will actively contribute to the JEF's activities and its development. The JEF will complement NATO's deterrence and defence in Finland's neighbouring

regions especially in situations preceding a potential invoking of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Finland will strive to develop the JEF so that it can operate flexibly with a strong operational capability in its core regions in Northern Europe. In addition, the JEF will need to bolster its ability of military countermeasures in all security situations.

Other multinational frameworks that will supplement Finland's defence cooperation network include the Framework Nation Concept, led by Germany, and the European Intervention Initiative, led by France. Participation in these frameworks that strive to develop their activities will support Finland's efforts to strengthen our defence capability, interoperability and situational awareness as well as our objectives in the EU and NATO. Being active in the frameworks will also help Finland develop our defence cooperation with the framework nations and other participating nations. Finland will support defence cooperation between the Nordic and Baltic countries and the cooperation between defence administrations in the Northern Group.

#### 4.7.2 Bilateral defence cooperation

Finland will continue to develop our bilateral defence cooperation. A key objective will be to improve interoperability in all security situations. Bilateral cooperation will include defence policy cooperation, defence materiel cooperation and military cooperation, among others. Finland's membership in NATO will open new opportunities to expand and deepen our bilateral cooperation. Bilateral cooperation between Allies will strengthen NATO's deterrence and defence. Besides the United States and European partners, South Korea, Israel and Japan are relevant partners in defence materiel cooperation for Finland.

Finland and Sweden deepened their defence cooperation systematically even before they joined NATO. Sweden will remain a strong bilateral ally of Finland, and the two countries will continue their extensive and far-reaching defence cooperation. The most important elements of the military cooperation between Finland and Sweden will be common operations planning, exchange of information and situational picture, training and exercises, and material cooperation and logistics. This cooperation will be further deepened to meet the needs of Allied cooperation. Sweden will have an important role as a transit nation for reinforcements to Finland. The long history of extensive cooperation between Finland and Sweden, our common operations planning and exercises will serve as a foundation for a strong alliance between our countries. Sweden's role as the framework nation for NATO's Forward Land Forces in Finland will further deepen the alliance between the two countries.

The cooperation between Finland and Norway is close, and it will deepen further in the coming years. Finland will increase and deepen its defence cooperation with Norway to meet the operational targets of our membership in NATO. Finland and Norway will build stronger joint-operation capabilities and strengthen deterrence especially through first response. Norway will have an important role as a transit nation for reinforcements to Finland. Norway's significance for Finland's defence materiel cooperation and military security of supply will be considerable.

Finland's cooperation with Denmark and Iceland will intensify as all Nordic countries are under the same Joint Force Command. This cooperation will also be developed bilaterally in relevant matters, such as defence materiel cooperation. It will cover the bilateral and multilateral cooperation within the framework of NORDEFCO.

The United States (US) is an important and close ally and a strategic partner for Finland. Our defence cooperation strengthen Finland's defence capability. The cooperation with Finland and the US will be deepened within the framework of the bilateral statement of intent, signed in 2016 between our defence administrations, and the Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA), signed in 2024. The US is the most important external actor in Northern Europe. Its commitment to NATO and its military presence in Europe will be of central importance to the security of Finland. Finland's close and deepening bilateral defence cooperation with the US will strengthen our defence and support the implementation of NATO's deterrence and defence.

The DCA between Finland and the US will enable operations planning and cooperation in all security situations. In the implementation of the DCA, Finland will focus on enabling US forces a seamless entry into and movement within Finland, the staging of forces and the prepositioning of equipment, supplies and materiel. All Nordic countries have a bilateral defence cooperation agreement with the US, which highlights the importance of coordinating DCA implementation among the Nordic countries. Finland and the US will continue their close cooperation in defence materiel matters. They will deepen their cooperation in research, development and technology, especially concerning critical and disruptive technologies to support defence readiness and technological expertise.

Finland will systematically deepen its cooperation with the United Kingdom (UK). The cooperation will aim to increase stability and security in Northern Europe and strengthen the defence of Finland, the UK and NATO. Finland will need an ability to act together with the UK in all security situations. Our contribution to the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) will reinforce the bilateral relations between Finland and the UK. Finland will support the efforts to deepen the security and defence cooperation between the EU and the UK.

Finland will strengthen its defence cooperation with Estonia. The objective will be to improve military interoperability and situational awareness and thereby strengthen NATO's deterrence and defence in the Baltic Sea. Besides their bilateral defence cooperation, Finland and Estonia will also work together under the auspices of NATO, the EU and several country groups. In addition, Finland will develop its defence cooperation with Latvia and Lithuania especially within the framework of NATO and the country groups.

Finland will deepen its bilateral defence cooperation with Germany, emphasising especially cooperation in the Baltic Sea region where Germany has an important role. Finland's cooperation with France will be promoted considering the position of France as a key European military actor and the two countries' established cooperation in crisis management operations. Finland will acknowledge Poland's significant capability investments and its role in the defence of the Baltic Sea region, which create a firmer foundation for developing mutual defence cooperation between Finland and Poland. Finland will also develop its cooperation with Germany, France and Poland in the framework of NATO, the EU and relevant country groups.

Developments in the Indo-Pacific will affect the security of Finland, too. Finland will support the EU's and NATO's efforts to deepen cooperation with their partners in the Indo-Pacific. Finland will invest in deepening its relations with the NATO Ally Canada and the NATO partners Australia, South Korea and Japan.

#### **4.7.3 Military crisis management, rapid response forces and other operations abroad**

Finland's participation in operations abroad includes military crisis management operations, training and advisory missions, international cooperation and aid operations, and contribution to NATO's collective peacetime activities.

Crisis management is a central instrument of foreign, security and defence policy that supports conflict resolution, post-conflict stabilisation and the building of safe societies. Military crisis management maintains or restores international peace and security or supports humanitarian aid efforts or protects civilian populations. Finland's contribution will help achieve the objectives of Finland's foreign, security and defence policy and improve our homeland defence capability.

Finland will continue to participate in international military and civilian crisis management operations and missions under the auspices of the EU, the UN, NATO and the framework nations of country groups. Finland's approach will emphasise comprehensive crisis management and the necessity and impact of activities. By participating in international crisis management operations and missions, Finland will promote social stability, peace, human rights, the rule of law and equality in conflict areas. The Finnish defence administration will take active part in the planning and evaluation of operations and missions. It will also develop the impact assessment of military crisis management together with national and international actors.

Finland will contribute to NATO's peacetime activities on a regular basis. This contribution will be part of NATO's burden sharing and a concrete demonstration of Finland's commitment to NATO's deterrence and defence throughout the Alliance. It will also strengthen the stability of the security environment.

Finland will contribute to the rapid reaction forces of NATO, the EU and the UN and to the development of the forces. The European Union Rapid Deployment Capacity (EU RDC), consisting of EU Battlegroups and their strategic enablers, is designed to be used outside the EU, whereas NATO's Allied Reaction Force (ARF) is designed to defend the Alliance. The ARF can be employed in all NATO's core tasks as decided by the North Atlantic Council. Finland will develop its contribution to the ARF and the EU Battlegroups, taking into account its national resources.

Finland will consider its troops deployed abroad as a whole that consists of military crisis management operations and missions, NATO's peacetime activities and NATO's and the EU's rapid reaction forces. The balance between contribution needs and national resources may necessitate changes to the current level of contribution to military crisis management operations and missions.

#### **4.7.4 International exercises**

International exercises are an important component of homeland defence capability, NATO's deterrence and defence posture and bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation. As a NATO member, Finland will participate in collective defence training and exercises and carry out evaluations in accordance with NATO standards. Allied exercises will aim to improve, ascertain and ensure interoperability and the enforceability of operations plans at all levels.

Finland will participate in NATO exercises throughout the territory of the Alliance. The training and exercises of the Finnish Defence Forces will be closely integrated into NATO's exercises. This is especially important regarding the Defence Forces' command post exercises and large-scale live exercises. It is important that collective defence exercises testing NATO's DDA Family of Plans will also be organised in Finland. Such exercises will increase Allies' familiarity with the northern operating environment and its conditions. Moreover, it will be important to exercise the use of Allied strategic capabilities (e.g. air-to-air refuelling and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) in Finland and its neighbouring regions.

Finland will enable international exercises in its territory. This will be important as it will make Allied training and exercises and long-standing Allied presence possible in Finland to a greater extent than before. It will also help adjust the level of defence readiness.

#### 4.7.5 Ukraine

Finland is committed to supporting Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised 1991 borders, including the territorial sea. Finland will continue to provide Ukraine with security assistance and training and seek new and innovative ways to bolster its support to Ukraine for the long term. Besides bilateral support, Finland will also actively contribute to supporting Ukraine's defence sector through different kinds of international initiatives, such as the coalitions to develop the capabilities of Ukraine's armed forces and the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU).

Finland has made a national decision to ramp up the domestic production of heavy ammunition, which will enable Finland to continue to provide Ukraine with materiel assistance on a sustainable basis. Supporting Ukraine is also seen as an opportunity to boost industrial demand and technological development in Finland. Finland finds it important to strengthen both Ukraine's domestic defence industry and the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base.

Finland will deepen its bilateral defence cooperation with Ukraine. Key areas of cooperation will include information sharing, military cooperation and defence materiel cooperation.

The security commitments given to Ukraine by Finland and many other countries will anchor Ukraine as part of the Euro-Atlantic security system and serve as a bridge to Ukraine's forthcoming EU and NATO memberships.



For Finland, it will be important that Allies continue to provide Ukraine with long-term materiel, financial and other assistance. Ukraine's armed forces and their interoperability will be developed through bilateral and multilateral cooperation and within the framework of the EU and NATO. Finland's goal will be for the EU to continue to provide strong political, economic and military support, materiel assistance and humanitarian aid for Ukraine for as long as necessary. Finland supports Ukraine's aspirations to hold Russia accountable for its war crimes, including the damage to infrastructure and the environment.

## 4.8 Key prerequisites for Finnish defence

### 4.8.1 Personnel

Changes in the operating environment and Finland's accession to NATO have created a need for more personnel in the Finnish Defence Forces. In addition, the personnel numbers in the Defence Forces have been raised because of new obligations assigned to the Defence Forces in recent years. The goal is that the staff the Defence Forces has at its disposal is sufficient in terms of quantity, competence and motivation and that they perform their duties reliably in all levels of readiness at home and abroad. Reaching this goal and managing the operating environment's drivers of change will require sufficient personnel numbers, appropriate allocation of personnel for the performance of duties and legislation that enables, when necessary, the use of the regular personnel and persons liable for military service in Article 5 tasks throughout the Alliance.

As outlined in the previous Government Defence Report, the number of personnel in the Defence Forces will be raised by 500 person-years. This increase will be fast-tracked in 2023–2026. At the same time, the number of contractual soldiers was permanently raised to 500 person-years as of 2024. The additional human resources are being allocated to readiness, exercises, the fielding of new capabilities and the increasing need to train conscripts and reservists. Conscript and reservist training will be given the human resources necessary for meeting its performance targets.

Finland's military alliance has altered the range of the defence administration's tasks and functions. The collective defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will be added to the statutory duties of the Finnish Defence Forces. In addition to the above-mentioned increase of 500 person-years, the Defence Forces will need an additional increase of 1,500 person-years in its salaried personnel during this and the next electoral period. Moreover, a new system of voluntary engagement contracts will be created for the implementation of the Capability Targets

apportioned to Finland in the NATO Defence Planning Process. Arrangements to assign the Defence Forces' regular personnel to NATO structures will need to be orderly and within the capacity of the personnel system.

Finland's military alliance has also significantly increased the duties of the Ministry of Defence, and additional personnel have been sent to the Permanent Representation of Finland to NATO. The Ministry of Defence will need more personnel during the period of the report so that it can process all the new themes arising from Finland's membership in NATO and promote Finland's objectives in NATO.

The personnel needs associated with NATO membership will include the assignment of additional personnel to NATO structures, the contribution to NATO's peacetime activities and Allied Reaction Force, the enablement of NATO presence in Finland, the implementation of the Capability Targets apportioned to Finland in the NATO Defence Planning Process and the participation in Article 5 collective defence tasks throughout the Alliance. In addition, Finland will continue to contribute to international military crisis management operations and missions, other international tasks and exercises and to deepen its defence cooperation. All these are important for improving international competence in Finland. Personnel arrangements will consider developments in the European Union's defence dimension and in other defence cooperation. The need to increase personnel numbers in Finland will arise from changes in the operating environment, from the growing commitments in the Ministry of Defence's branch of government and associated demands to raise the defence budget and from the growing needs to amend the legislation.

To ensure the resources needed for the new duties, the legislation so that, where necessary, any member of the regular personnel of the Finnish Defence Forces could be assigned to any of the the Defence Forces statutory tasks. Also, the goal is to ensure that those liable for military service could be assigned more flexibly to tasks of the Defence Forces and NATO both at home and abroad. A number of fixed-term positions will be allocated to the Defence Forces for assigning personnel to international tasks and, where necessary, for improving readiness in Finland. To this end, it will also be reviewed whether the employment relationship of a professional soldier who has reached the lowest compulsory retirement age could be re-recruited and transferred to another military post, where necessary. It will be necessary to prepare for changes in the operating environment by enabling more flexible use of personnel and making provisions for increasing the personnel numbers when the situation so requires.

The Finnish Defence Forces will need to be able generate forces to collective defence tasks and ensure their deployability in accordance with the Capability Targets apportioned to Finland in the NATO Defence Planning Process. It will be necessary to ensure that the Defence Forces' troops can be deployed outside Finland's borders in NATO tasks based on separate decisions. This will be the first time Finland has such a continuous commitment. The Finnish legislation must be updated to reach this goal.

The Finnish Defence Forces published its personnel strategy in early 2024. The strategy covers both the regular personnel of the Defence Forces and those liable for military service. It describes how the Defence Forces intends to tackle the challenges created by the changes in the operating environment.

Personnel numbers have a critical impact on coping at work. The personnel's coping and performance at work will be supported by ensuring a high standard of working-hours management and the management of capacity and ability to work, by using and developing flexible work methods and working-hours arrangements and by assessing personnel survey results and by addressing any identified issues. In addition, the possibilities to develop the terms of employment of the Defence Forces' personnel both at home and abroad will be reviewed, taking into account budgetary constraints. This review will be done in cooperation with personnel organisations.

Gender equality and non-discrimination perspectives will be integrated into the activities of the Ministry of Defence and its branch of government. Gender equality and non-discrimination planning will also consider the Government Action Plan for Combating Racism and Promoting Good Relations between Population Groups. The increase in the Defence Forces' international activities will stress the need to integrate more efficiently gender equality and the Women, Peace and Security and Youth, Peace and Security agendas of the United Nations Security Council into military crisis management operations and missions and especially into national security and preparedness efforts.

The development of the personnel system will be continued, with due regard to the effects of Finland's military alliance.

## 4.8.2 Financial resources

Finland's defence capability will be sustained and developed systematically. Long-term planning will ensure a strong homeland defence capability as part of NATO's deterrence and defence. Finland's integration with NATO will incur significant additional costs for Finnish defence.

Sufficient financing will need to be ensured across government terms to safeguard the key prerequisites of Finnish defence. Expenditure will need to be kept at a high enough level even after the procurement of the F-35 multi-role fighters is finalised and the additional financing granted following Russia's invasion of Ukraine ends. More detailed financing decisions will be taken in connection with general government fiscal plans and budgets.

Well-balanced and sustainable public finances will be a key condition for the development of defence. Besides, countries with strong a defence capability will be safe and stable operating environments for foreign investment, which will also improve the outlook for public finances. The development of defence capability will require long-term investments in all economic situations.

Finland will sustain and develop its defence in accordance with Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty and honour its commitment to burden sharing in NATO. To this end, Finland's defence spending across government terms will be kept at least at the level commonly agreed in NATO.

The level of defence spending will take into account Finland's strategic location at NATO's external border and the long-term threat of Russia, which may rapidly change its character. During the period of the report, funding will be needed for the modernisation process of land defence, for the sustainment and development of activities and readiness, for the finalisation of Finland's integration with NATO and for any new tasks arising from NATO.

The modernisation process of the Finnish land defence is ongoing and will last until the end of the 2030s. The development needs will be complex and long-lasting, encompassing the whole of land defence. The modernisation process of land defence will require a significant level of financing at least at a scale similar to the combined scale of the ongoing strategic capability programmes of the Navy and the Air Force.

In addition, the modernisation of the systems of conscription and voluntary national defence, the improvements to the financial benefits of conscripts and the strengthening of military intelligence and RDI, among other processes, will give rise to additional needs for funding.

A permanent raise to the level of defence appropriations will be needed to finalise Finland's integration with NATO. The Finnish Defence Forces will need more funding to raise personnel numbers, to meet the Capability Targets apportioned to Finland in NATO and to enable the activities of NATO and Allied forces in the territory of Finland. Enabling the reception of assistance will be vital so that Allies can reinforce Finland should we need help in defending our territory. The funding for Finland's contribution to NATO's peacetime activities and Allied Reaction Force will be determined based on political contribution decisions.


In 2025, the NATO Defence Planning Process will apportion new Capability Targets to all member states, including Finland. Additional funding will be needed to implement these targets. A main objective will be to strengthen NATO's ability to counter the long-term threat of Russia. As a result, the Finnish Defence Forces will need to meet a growing array of demands: It will need to develop the quality and quantity of its forces and systems, maintain rapid reaction readiness, improve its joint-operations capabilities and enable the flexible use of its forces within and outside the territory of Finland. The effects of the Defence Forces' growing number of activities will need to be reflected in the capabilities and infrastructure of the logistics system responsible for the sustainment of troops. The implementation of the new Capability Targets apportioned to Finland will strengthen Finland's defence capability.

The need for significant new construction of military infrastructure will raise the Defence Forces' rental expenditure on a permanent basis. Infrastructure projects necessitated by collective defence and NATO presence in Finland may be partially financed through NATO's common funding. The implementation of the DCA will also require additional investment in infrastructure. To this end, a sufficiently large investment authorisation will need to be assigned to Senate Group and allocated to Defence Properties Finland. In addition, an appropriation to cover the increase in rental expenditure will need to be earmarked for the Defence Forces.

The sustainable maintenance and continuous development of Finland's defence capability will require that personnel numbers and the level of appropriations be sufficient to finance the activities, materiel investments and NATO commitments. It will always be more profitable to invest in defence on a long-term basis than to be drawn into a military conflict, which would multiply the level of defence spending.

Sustaining and developing Finland's defence capability in ways that reflect developments in the operating environment will require a balanced defence budget in terms of personnel, procurements, activities and the upkeep of military infrastructure. Changes to the funding of one component will affect other components, too. This balance will be challenged by the need to maintain readiness at a level necessitated by the operating environment, keep up with the rapid technological advancements, meet the higher prices of materiel and build new infrastructure.

**Figure 4.** Interdependence of defence budget elements



The Squadron 2020 and the F-35 procurement programmes will be finalised according to the original plan. The index costs and foreign exchange costs created by these procurements will be covered separately in annual budgets. The unallocated financing portions of the multirole fighter procurement will be annually adjusted for purchasing power and cost level, as necessary.

During the period of this report, cost-level adjustments will be made to the appropriations for the Defence Forces' operating expenditure (excluding wages), defence materiel procurement, multi-role fighter procurement and the equipment and administrative expenditure of military crisis management operations, as an established practice.

The equipment and materiel the Finnish Defence Forces has donated to Ukraine will be replaced in full. This will also include support to industry and the ammunition production.

The enablement of NATO and Allied forces in Finland will create new commitments regarding, for example, logistics infrastructure, security of supply and military medical support. Some of these will also be financed using the appropriations of other branches of government. Total defence and its coordination across branches of government will be strengthened by incorporating the resource needs into the main titles of expenditure, arranged according to ministries and their branches of government.

Finland emphasises the need to ensure NATO the resources it needs to stay capable in the changed security environment. To this end, all member states will need to have their defence spending at least at the minimum level agreed in NATO. They will also need to develop their contribution to operational activities. Finland's objective is to extend the scope of NATO's common funding to include collective activities that help strengthen NATO's deterrence and defence. It will be important for Finland that the EU adopt defence as one of the priorities of its multiannual financial framework (MFF) in 2028–2034. In Finland's view, the proportion of financing allocated to defence (including military mobility), crisis preparedness and border security should be increased.

### **How does Finland's defence benefit from Finland's membership in NATO?**

The greatest benefit of Finland joining NATO is that our deterrence is now stronger, which in turn lowers the threat of war. Ultimately, Finland's defence is supported by the military power of the entire Alliance, including its nuclear deterrence. The added value of deterrence for Finland's security cannot be measured in euros. However, it has been estimated that had Finland not joined NATO it would need to spend considerably more on defence than it does at present to maintain and develop its defence capability as a country sharing a border with Russia. NATO's advance preparations – including operations plans and regular exercises to test them as well command and control structures – strengthen deterrence and, if needed, enable the implementation of collective defence. Allied forces and capabilities will be deployed to reinforce Finland, should they be needed.

As a NATO member, Finland has access to capabilities it itself would not be able to develop sufficiently or at all. Such capabilities include logistic support, NATO's Allied Reaction Force (ARF), NATO's Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) capabilities, certain space capabilities, missile defence capabilities and, as a last-resort, nuclear weapons. Finland's military security of supply will improve in terms of secured sea lines of communication and access to spare parts. The membership also has a positive impact on the Finnish defence industry.

Finland's location at NATO's external border means that the Finnish defence system will need to maintain its capabilities even in future at a level that enable first response with national capabilities. However, as a member, Finland can work within NATO and develop its activities through deeper defence cooperation in ways that would not be possible outside the Alliance.

One such new arrangement concerns air surveillance: NATO Allies can conduct missions to identify and monitor aircraft flexibly across Allied borders and operate from each other's airbases. As a NATO member, Finland will have more opportunities for deeper cooperation especially with countries under the same Joint Forces Command. For example, Allies can operate more cost-efficiently if they procure or deploy some of their capabilities together.

Finland can apply for NATO's common funding for building and improving logistical capabilities and infrastructure needed for collective defence. In addition, Finland will continue to use the EU's funds for military mobility and other financial instruments.

### 4.8.3 Legislation

The Finnish legislation's fitness for purpose in the evolving operating environment is monitored comprehensively. The Ministry of Defence's branch of government will continue to review the legislation in light of Finland's commitments as a NATO member. Some of the changes arise not only from Finland's NATO membership but also from the need to enable and facilitate international defence cooperation.



Key development needs associated with Finland's membership in NATO are related to the duties, powers and authorities of the Finnish Defence Forces, the participation of the regular personnel of the Defence Forces and those liable for military service in NATO's deterrence and defence tasks and the legal status of the individuals engaged in such tasks.

Finland will continuously participate in the implementation of NATO's deterrence and defence. This creates new kinds of tasks for the Finnish Defence Forces that deviate from Finland's previous contribution to international assistance and cooperation and military crisis management operations and missions. Examples of such tasks include the Defence Forces' participation in NATO's collective peacetime activities and the future participation in NATO's Allied Reaction Force. The Defence Forces will also need to adopt more flexible ways to operate with Allies to demonstrate deterrence and to surveil and protect territorial integrity together. These tasks will now be part of the normal activities of the Finnish Defence Forces.

Finland is reviewing the provisions on territorial surveillance to ensure seamless cooperation with NATO and enable activities in all security situations and levels of readiness. The provisions on the use of force and on powers and authorities will also be reviewed. The objective is that the forces and capabilities for surveillance and protection of territorial integrity can be used flexibly according to the operational needs and even have the ability for basing across state borders. Moreover, access to similar capabilities from several countries will make operations more effective and flexible.

Finland needs to reassess its national decision-making processes concerning NATO. The legislation governing Finland's activities as a NATO member and the related decision-making will be reviewed to ensure sufficient powers and authorities and appropriate procedures and levels of decision-making. It will be examined whether the Ministry of Defence could be assigned more decision-making powers in consultation with other key actors.

The Finnish legislation will be amended to enable that NATO forces can enter Finland seamlessly and operate and receive the necessary protection while in Finland. For example, provisions on the import of materiel and equipment, customs clearance, taxation, permits, rights to drive military vehicles and the organisation of military medical support will need to be amended. The Finnish legislation will enable the presence of NATO structures and personnel in Finland.

Development needs have also been identified in other areas of legislation, such as the technical security of the defence administration and the processing of personal data. The goal will be to finalise the new regulation on the transport of dangerous goods, military explosives, electrical safety supervision and the processing of personal data in the Finnish Defence Forces and the Finnish Border Guard, taking into account international exercises and cooperation.

The legislation governing real estate transactions by foreigners will be revised to better tackle observed possibilities for circumventing the law. In addition, the need for and possibilities of supervising other forms of real estate possession, such as land leasing and the purchase or renting of housing shares, will be reviewed.

It is critical for cyber defence to draw up the necessary legislation on cyber defence and to develop related acts and decrees. The legislation will be reviewed with regard to the formation of the Finnish Defence Forces' tasks, the safeguarding of state sovereignty in the cyber domain, the cooperation between various actors and the decision-making concerning the execution of cyber operations by the Defence Forces. The Defence Forces will need the capability and authority to carry out offensive cyber operations and other active cyber defence operations below the threshold of armed attack within and outside the territory of Finland. It will also need to be able to collect information and intelligence to support such activities. This review will also consider Finland's contribution and commitments to NATO's cyber defence and to other international cooperation.

The Ministry of Defence has initiated a legislative project to develop the conscription system. It will focus on improving the call-up system and enabling the flexible use and participation of people liable for military service in NATO's collective defence tasks outside the territory of Finland, among other objectives. Voluntary military service for men who have the right of domicile in Åland and are, therefore, exempt from military service will be ensured and provisions on the legal effects of that service will be enacted. The process to develop the legislation on voluntary national defence will continue.

In addition, the need to develop the Act on Military Intelligence and the Act on the Export of Defence Materiel will be reviewed and any necessary amendments will be prepared. Any legislative amendment necessitated by NATO standardization agreements (STANAG) will be implemented on case-by-case basis.

A new legislative project will be launched to include into the legislation an obligation to consult the Finnish Defence Forces when planned wind power projects might affect territorial surveillance.

Provisions on the public administration's obligation for general preparedness will be laid down in the Emergency Powers Act. The overhaul of the Emergency Powers Act (OM015:00/2022) will update the act to correspond with the modern understanding of the comprehensive security of society and the threats facing it and of the identification of various threats and incidents that have serious effects. It will be essential for the Finnish defence administration that legislation for normal conditions, the Emergency Powers Act and the State of Defence Act enable total-defence preparedness in all branches of government and access to society's resources.

#### 4.8.4 Digitalisation and utilisation of data

Digitalisation and the utilisation of data will enable faster and more efficient decision making. This will require timely access to relevant data with a sufficient level of enrichment and refinement. Improving efficiency will require a common purpose and understanding of objectives at levels of command as well as technical and functional interoperability at political, military and technical levels both nationally and in cooperation with Allies and partners. Competence, culture, processes and technologies will need to be developed systematically, and sufficient personnel resources will need to be allocated to ensure efficient use of data and networks.

The Finnish Defence Forces will continue its integration with NATO by developing its information management processes, by implementing the data and communications technology solutions necessary for preparation and decision-making processes and by modernising its facilities. NATO's requirements and standards on information management and information security will be applied to the full in national development efforts. This work will be supported by the Defence Forces' independent capability to audit, certify and accredit data systems and encryption products. The objective will be for the Defence Forces to have an independent capability for audition, certification and accreditation. Finland's NATO membership, our deepening bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation and the higher demands on information exchange will necessitate additional resources.

The Finnish Defence Forces will develop its data processing environments to meet the demands of emerging threats and new data and information processing needs. Comprehensive management of information security that is based on legislation, standards and NATO requirements will help identify and control risks. The risks of cloud technologies will need to be audited at the national level and a solution adopted before cloud technologies may be used to process classified information.

The Defence Forces will continue to use data and artificial intelligence to support analytics and daily work. To this end, it will reorganise its activities and management models, allocate human resources and improve the personnel's competence.

The competence and supply chains concerning the highest levels of national non-disclosable information will stay in national control. This will require national capacity to develop, produce, assess, certify and accredit encryption products for highest levels of classified information. The Finnish Defence Forces will also need encryption capabilities enabling the security authorities' activities in all situations. Such capabilities will include high-performance computing, cryptanalysis and reverse engineering. A national encryption laboratory will be created to support research, competence development, domestic production capacity and the tasks of different authorities. Building a national ecosystem will require strategic target-setting and the contribution and support of the central government through cross-government cooperation.

#### 4.8.5 Research, development and innovation

The operating environment of defence is increasingly multidimensional due to the fast and unpredictable development of technology and the growing technological requirements of weapons systems and the battlefield.

Critical factors for defence capability planning and development and for procuring, operating and sustaining capabilities in Finland will be the defence administration's own proactive technological situational awareness, its strategic choices based on that awareness and the systematic competence management. Military sciences and wide-ranging defence research will have a pronounced role in competence management. The defence administration will need a capacity to develop competence and materiel readiness in more flexible ways and to an increasing degree in collaboration with external actors.

The development of the competence necessary for defence will be based on national strengths, the research, development, and innovation (RDI) system and the capacity to generate new information, technological competence and commercialisable innovations. Maintaining competence will be important due to the rapid development of technologies and the long life-cycles of systems. The foundation for innovation capabilities under emergency conditions is laid under normal conditions.

The Finnish defence administration will promote RDI in the domestic defence industry based on its capability requirements so that, as a rule, RDI services are primarily contracted from domestic sources. It is equally crucial for domestic competence and industrial development to promote target-oriented cooperation in NATO and the EU and in other bilateral and multilateral frameworks for RDI cooperation. Access to international financial mechanisms will also be facilitated. The growing demands presuppose an increased RDI volume and more systematically managed RDI apparatus.

#### 4.8.6 Military security of supply and partnerships

Finland's membership in NATO places new demands on and creates new opportunities for military security of supply. Military security of supply will enable the operative activities of the Finnish Defence Forces and Allied forces in Finland and safeguard the functioning of the vital systems of the Defence Forces. Wartime defence capability is largely based on resources available in society. It is necessary to coordinate Finland's preparedness for military crises and other emergencies between different actors as part of total defence to safeguard military security of supply.

The most important objective is to enable implementation and improve the executability of NATO's regional plans in Northern Europe. This will be done together with Sweden, Norway and other Allies and as part of NORDEFCO. Military security of supply and the support from society and other authorities to defence will be developed according to the needs of NATO's DDA Family of Plans and the Nordic Joint Logistics and Support Network. Logistics infrastructure will need to be developed especially in Northern Finland to improve security of supply. Contingencies will have to be in place to safeguard security of supply even in the event of disruptions to the sea lines of communication in the Baltic Sea.

Finland's preparedness for a protracted military conflict requires an increasing volume of emergency stocks and production and a higher level of production capacity. Military security of supply will be based on a sufficient industrial capacity that has been built under normal conditions as well as on competent personnel and stocks of prepositioned materiel. The industry will need a sufficient and continuous volume of orders to maintain production and personnel competence at levels that are necessary for preparedness. In its procurement, the defence administration will prioritise companies that are critical for security of supply.

Command and control, networking, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, targeting support, engagement and protection will be capabilities that are critical for military security of supply. It will be important to safeguard the ability to recover after incidents, repair critical infrastructure and operate systems independently both under normal conditions and under emergency conditions. In addition, advancements in digitalisation will boost the importance of cybersecurity and encryption technologies. In particular, it will be necessary to incorporate the growing significance of emerging and disruptive technologies into solutions of domestic defence industry production and technological competence.

Cooperation between the defence administration, the government ministries and the National Emergency Supply Agency will be deepened to strengthen military security of supply. Security of supply functions will be better integrated with the coordination of total defence, and they will be ensured sufficient resources.

War economy means that the economy is adjusted to emergency conditions, defence materiel production is expanded, and security of supply is safeguarded through cross-government measures. The readiness of society to shift to war economy will be maintained and developed actively as part of total defence.

Shifting to war economy will require preparedness measures during normal conditions that are based on cross-government preparedness planning. Industrial, technological and materiel self-sufficiency will be improved and maintained by financing a sufficient volume of orders for the industry and service providers. The readiness of industry and service providers to continue their production during incidents and emergencies will be safeguarded through wide-ranging orders and test purchasing based on security of supply needs. These measures will ensure that the Finnish Defence Forces has the capabilities necessary for homeland defence and collective defence.

The Finnish Defence Forces' partners and their subcontracting chains play a significant and established role in the defence system. The services provided by the strategic partners, in particular, are of critical importance to the core functions of the Defence Forces and to security of supply. They also have links to the key security interests of the state. The Defence Forces and its partners need an ability to react quickly to changes in the operating and security environment in cooperation with our Allies and especially the Nordic countries. Partnerships are deepened under normal conditions, for example by working in a shared environment, to ensure the continuity of operations even in rapidly developing crises.

It will be reviewed how the changes in the operating environment and Finland's membership in NATO affect the Finnish Defence Forces' logistics system. This work will lay a foundation for the developing of partnerships. The aim will be to ensure the capabilities necessary in emergencies and, based on that, determine the level of ambition for each partnership. Special attention will be paid to the preparedness of partners to ensure their operations in all security situations, including the availability of personnel.

#### 4.8.7 Defence industry

Production, technology and know-how critical to homeland defence will be available and accessible in all security situations. The availability of technology and the ability to create and integrate new technologies and technological solutions into the defence system cost-efficiently will require a sufficient national level of industrial and technological competence and an appropriate level of production capacity. It is particularly important to ensure the upkeep of critical technological systems and the production of critical consumables for homeland defence at a sufficient volume and necessary speed even under emergency conditions. Despite Finland's foreign dependence on defence materiel procurement and availability, a national capacity to maintain the most critical systems will be safeguarded.

An important element of military security of supply is an effective, viable and internationally competitive domestic defence industry. International networking and exports help Finland to sustain and develop military security of supply and enable homeland defence. As a Member State of the European Union, Finland will help small and medium-sized enterprises to access supply chains in the defence sector and advocate for equal opportunities in terms of business operations and competition. It will be ensured that Finnish technological competence is widely used in Europe and that the Finnish industry has the opportunity for broad-based collaboration and networking in the EU's defence materiel market. The European Defence Fund will be utilised to develop the competitiveness and capabilities of the Finnish and European defence industry and research community in the long term.

The export opportunities and international contacts of the Finnish defence industry will be fostered to strengthen Finland's military defence and security of supply. Military security of supply will also be improved through deeper cooperation with domestic and foreign industries, which will promote and strengthen interdependencies. Exporting defence equipment and materiel in compliance

with Finland's international commitments will support the technological and industrial base of Finnish defence. Responsible export control is based on careful consideration on a case-by-case basis.

Domestic defence industrial base will be protected against cyber threats in collaboration with the industry. This aim will be achieved by preparing strategic cyber security guidelines for the defence industrial base and by improving information exchange. Possibilities for support from the Defence Forces to the industry and cooperation between them during major cyber incidents and crises will also be developed. In addition, procurement contracts, for example, will be developed to take into account cyber threats on a larger scale than before, and the needs for adjusting regulation and control will be examined.

#### 4.8.8 Infrastructure and energy

Significant investment will be needed in the infrastructure supporting homeland defence throughout the 2020s due to the changed security situation and Finland's international undertakings. The needs to build and develop the facilities and premises of the Finnish Defence Forces will multiply. Operations planning together with the Alliance and Allies will set demands and grounds for infrastructure development. Finland's priorities will be to develop the Defence Forces' capabilities as part of NATO, to build infrastructure required by collective defence and the DCA with the United States and to invest in usable, effective and healthy facilities. The logistics infrastructure and its dual-use capacity will be developed especially in Northern Finland, including cross-border connections to Sweden and Norway. However, significant development needs will be found even elsewhere in Finland. This work will also consider preparedness arrangements concerning the security of supply.

The possibilities of using NATO's and the EU's financial mechanisms will be developed. Investment planning and implementation will take into account the administrative decisions, investment models and the need to invest in shared infrastructure associated with the DCA.

Defence Properties Finland, as a partner to the Finnish Defence Forces, will support the readiness, preparedness and security of the Defence Forces by ensuring the usability and protection afforded by facilities. The strategic planning and management of facilities investments will be developed in cooperation between the Defence Forces and Defence Properties Finland. The aim will be to improve cost-efficiency, increase the flexible use of facilities and curb the growth of costs.



Under both normal and emergency conditions, the Finnish Defence Forces will be dependent on the infrastructure in society and on the services enabling the Defence Forces to use the infrastructure, such as maintenance and services providing weather, conditions and geographic information. Transport infrastructure, ports and airports and their critical services and systems, such as air navigation facilities, and road transport connections enable the Finnish Defence Forces to perform its statutory duties and related exercises at all levels of readiness and in all situations, even when affected by GPS interference. The development needs concerning the protection of infrastructures and associated functions critical to homeland defence and the continuity management will be evaluated in cross-government cooperation under the lead of the Ministry of Defence. Also, the legislation, processes and situation picture regarding the supervision of foreign real-estate ownership will be developed further.

The defence administration will continue to actively participate in and exert influence over land use planning and the preparation of the Government's nature conservation policy to safeguard the area needs and prerequisites of homeland defence. It will strive to consolidate its activities with the overall functions of society within the scope of Finland's defence capability.

The ongoing energy transition from fossil fuels towards a system using renewable and zero-emission energy sources will be expected to progress swiftly in Europe. While homeland defence will not be giving up fossil fuels for a long time, the Finnish defence administration will strive to develop other energy sources and solutions harnessing the variety of energy sources and the decentralisation of energy production. A controlled transition towards carbon neutrality will be a challenge for homeland defence, and international cooperation to find solutions will be needed within NATO and the EU.

The energy transition will be taken into account in the sustainment arrangements and capability development of the Finnish Defence Forces. Energy self-sufficiency, security of supply and resilience will be improved as part of the energy system reform. Defence capability and security of supply will not be endangered in the energy transition.

The construction of wind and solar power will continue to observe the prerequisites of homeland defence and the implementation of the Finnish Defence Forces' statutory duties. Wind farm placement has an impact on territorial surveillance, the communication and command systems of the Defence Forces and on the usability of exercise areas. The defence administration welcomes the construction of wind

power in areas where it does not interfere with the prerequisites of homeland defence. It will continue to advance the consolidation of wind-power construction and homeland defence.

#### 4.8.9 Sustainable development and the environment

Climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution have direct and indirect security implications for Finland and also affect the activities of the defence administration.

Environmental responsibility is integrated into all activities of the Finnish Defence Forces without compromising Finland's defence capability. This contributes to enabling Finland's defence in the changing operating environment. However, no compromises will be made on defence capability. All Finnish Defence Forces' national and international activities take into account the effective management of environmental risks and the prevention of environmental damage. The Defence Forces will continue to develop its environmental responsibility in line with its environmental strategy and the strategy's implementation plan.

The Finnish defence administration will help realise the Finnish Government's climate neutrality target, taking into account the needs of Finnish defence. It will also monitor the effects of climate change on the operating and security environment. For example, it will take into account in its planning the necessary adaptation to the effects of climate-change-induced weather events.

Responsibility, sustainable development and climate change are important themes in NATO, the EU and in international defence cooperation in general. The Finnish defence administration will continue to implement the United Nation's 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The defence sector will adopt measures to prepare for climate change, to reduce its carbon footprint and to improve its energy efficiency, while ensuring its deterrence and defence capability. Moreover, the defence administration will continue to be active in other efforts to advance international environmental responsibility, promote the energy transition and mitigate climate change. It participates actively in the defence cooperation on climate change adaptation.

#### 4.8.10 Countering information influence activities, and strategic communications

Information influence activities mean systematic malicious activities designed to influence decision-makers, public opinion and people's behaviour, sense of security and trust in society and, lastly, the functioning of society. Information influence activities use a great variety of methods, such as the dissemination of false or misleading information, the manipulative use of information that is in itself correct by separating facts from context, coercion and targeted harassment on social media and the harnessing of new technologies, for example, to make deepfake videos. In addition, information influence activities can be an element of broad-spectrum influencing that uses other hostile means of exerting influence. The exploitation of the information environment and society's vulnerabilities may endanger vital functions of society, undermine social stability and weaken the target country's international position.

Strategic communications mean goal-oriented, proactive communications that are a seamless component of command and control and that employ analyses of the information environment and target groups and the situational awareness formed from such analyses. Strategic communications are closely linked to command and control. They are planned based on a constantly updated situational awareness, which is the only way of ensuring that the trends, vulnerabilities, threats and risks of the information environment can be forecasted. Moreover, skilful strategic communications protect against information influence activities.

Information influence activities against Finland are detected and countered in a collaboration between different ministries and branches of government. The Prime Minister's Office, in cooperation with other branches of government, coordinates countermeasures and related strategic communications in exceptional situations and in cases where information influence activities are particularly extensive and affect several branches of government. To counter threats, public and private sector activities will be coordinated pre-emptively.

A national concept for information defence and the countering of information influence activities (information security concept) will be drawn up to prevent and counter information threats and to clarify shared situation picture, responsibilities and practices.

The Finnish defence administration will continuously monitor, assess and analyse the information environment and also make use of monitoring and analysis by other central government actors. The Ministry of Defence, together with the Finnish Defence Forces, will be responsible for countering information influence activities

against its branch of government. The defence administration will exchange situational awareness of information influence activities with partners and Allies, where necessary.

The rapid transformation of our security and information environment will require the Finnish defence administration to improve its readiness to detect and counter information influence activities and engage in strategic communications. To develop strategic communications, it will be necessary to consolidate the national military strategic communications with those of NATO and separately with those of our most important Allies.

The need for cross-government coordination will also be highlighted. Finland's membership in NATO means that cross-government cooperation, too, will have to develop its shared practices and situation awareness, carry out more extensive analyses of the information environment than before and adopt a proactive approach to strategic communications.

## 5 Conclusions

1. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the security environment of Finland and Europe has deteriorated fundamentally and far into the future.
2. Russia poses a protracted security threat to Europe and Finland now and in the future.
3. Finland will provide Ukraine with military equipment, security assistance and training as long as necessary.
4. Developments in the security environment necessitate a stronger deterrence and defence posture on NATO's eastern and northern flanks.
5. Finland's defence concept has changed. The new defence concept consists of a strong conscription-based homeland defence capability as part of NATO's deterrence and defence.
6. Finland's accession to NATO has strengthened deterrence and thereby lowered the risk of war. Finland's defence is supported by the forces and capabilities of the entire Alliance, including its nuclear deterrence as a last resort.
7. Finland is committed to supporting its allies.
8. Finland's defence will continue to be developed based on a threat of large-scale war and on the development of warfare, taking into account available resources.
9. The capabilities of the Finnish defence system will be developed based on national defence needs and the Capability Targets apportioned to Finland in the NATO Defence Planning Process. This covers the sustainment of existing capabilities, the replacing of ageing systems and the development of new capabilities.
10. An evolving conscription system, a trained large reserve and a strong will to defend the country are still the cornerstones of Finnish defence.
11. The importance of total defence is highlighted. Preparing against a military threat is the primary rationale for preparedness across all sectors of society.
12. The priorities of the defence system sustainment and development are the modernisation process of land defence, the taking into operational use of new maritime and air defence systems and the defence system's integration with NATO.

13. The modernisation process of land defence is of critical importance to Finland's defence capability.
14. The Defence Forces coordinates its capabilities and operations with those of Allies and the Alliance in all operational domains. The functioning of the defence system is linked with cyber and space domains.
15. The Finnish defence administration's ability and capacity to monitor and manage technologies and make full use of international RDI instruments will be reinforced. The operating conditions of the defence industry will be improved, and measures to boost production capacity will be supported to safeguard military security of supply.
16. The conditions for enabling NATO and Allied presence in Finland will be created during the current government term. This will make it possible to receive support for the defence of Finland.
17. Finland sets no caveats on its defence cooperation with Allies. Bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation support NATO's deterrence and defence.
18. It is essential for Finland that the European Union is strong and capable. Finland will continue to support the development of the EU's defence dimension.
19. Changes in the operating environment and Finland's accession to NATO necessitate a significant increase to the numbers of the Defence Forces' regular personnel during this and the next government terms.
20. The legislation governing the defence administration will be updated to reflect the new defence concept. A key objective is to enable the participation of those liable for military service in NATO missions outside the territory of Finland.
21. Finland's defence spending will be kept at least at the level of NATO's commonly agreed guideline for defence spending. Development of defence capability necessitates, across government terms, an adequate spending level as part of the general government (4-year) fiscal plan.
22. Sufficient long-term resourcing is the most critical factor for ensuring Finland's defence capability.

## Appendix: Concepts, definitions and explanations

Many of the concepts below also have a standard language meaning and other meanings. For some of the concepts, their meaning in this report is explained, instead of giving a definition.

**Defence concept** Defence concept describes the principles of implementing military defence. Finland's defence concept is built through a conscription-based defence capability as part of NATO's deterrence and defence.

**Defence capability** The ability for homeland defence and the ability of the Finnish Defence Forces to carry out its statutory duties. Besides the Alliance's collective defence, Finland's defence capability is supplemented by its membership of the European Union and by international defence cooperation. Finland's homeland defence capability is a combination of the defence system and of the support total defence gives to it. Finland defends its territory, population and society with all available resources together with Allies.

**Defence system** A functional set of military capabilities, consisting of personnel, materiel, processes and functions. It is divided into subsystems, which include intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, command and control, combat, logistics, troops production and resource planning.

**Broad-spectrum influencing** Broad-spectrum influencing is a threat perception used in the context of Finnish military preparedness. It includes hybrid influence activities, but it also encompasses the open use of military force. From the perspective of Finland's defence, exerting military pressure and the use of force are the most severe methods of broad-spectrum influencing.

**CBRNE** Hazards caused by chemical (C), biological (B), radiological (R) and nuclear (N) materials and agents and explosives (E) as well as by the misuse of expertise related to them (including use as weapons).

**Comprehensive security** Comprehensive security is based on the safeguarding of the vital functions of society: management of government affairs; international and EU activities; defence capability; internal security; economy, infrastructure and security of supply; services and the functional capacity of the population; and psychological resilience. The vital functions are safeguarded in cooperation between public authorities, the private sector, civil society organisations and citizens in all sectors and at the local, regional, national and international levels. Total defence is part of comprehensive security.

**Defence cooperation** The international, bilateral and multilateral cooperation in defence policy and military matters conducted under the guidance of the Ministry of Defence to support and strengthen Finland's defence capability and to improve interoperability. International exercises and international materiel cooperation are a part of defence cooperation.

**Defence planning** The primary function of the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) is the development and delivery of the range of forces, competence, readiness and capabilities that are necessary for undertaking the Alliance's full spectrum of missions. All NATO member states take part in the NDPP, and they are committed to developing their national capabilities based on collectively agreed targets. NATO's defence planning is closely linked to national capability planning and capability development. For more information, see section 4.2. Defence planning does not include operations planning.

**Emergency stockpiling** The stockpiling of defence materiel in preparedness for emergency conditions.

**Hybrid influence activities** There is no internationally accepted common definition of hybrid influence activities. Instead, there are several terms in use that have a similar or partially overlapping meaning (hybrid threats, hybrid influence activities, hybrid operations, hybrid warfare). Although the range of methods is understood to be wide, the descriptions often focus on the cyber domain and information environment. In the Government Defence Report, hybrid influence activities are seen from the perspective of military threats and readiness and referred to as 'broad-spectrum influencing'.

**Host nation support** Host nation support (HNS) contains measures taken by the civilian and military authorities and other actors in a host nation to support and enable the activities of another state's forces during normal and emergency conditions. HNS arrangements are an established component of international exercises, NATO presence or other military cooperation. HNS arrangements are always agreed on a case-by-case basis in accordance with international commitments and national legislation.



**Information defence** Information defence by the Finnish Defence Forces aims to identify and counter malicious information influence activities targeting the defence system. The cross-cutting nature of information defence requires the ability and powers to monitor the information environment, to exchange information, to protect against information influence activities and to enable activities in the information environment across administrative boundaries and together with the private sector.

**Military capability** Military capabilities include plans enabling the operations of systems and/or forces, usage and operating principles practiced for different tasks, sufficient and competent personnel, mission-essential equipment and infrastructure, and military logistics support networks or support networks provided by society.

**Military cyber defence** Finland's military cyber defence is part of national cyber defence and NATO's cyber defence. Military cyber defence includes the measures taken especially against hostile state actors and their proxies to protect the systems and the stakeholders in various sectors that affect Finland's defence capability in order to ensure defence capability as well as the measures to safeguard the sovereignty of Finland and implement military cyber operations. Military cyber defence is based on the force structure and joint capabilities of the Finnish Defence Forces and on the resources of the entire society. The Finnish Defence Forces is responsible for Finland's military cyber defence and for its direction and implementation together with other authorities and sectors.

**Military mobility** The capabilities and ability to move military troops, equipment and materiel quickly and flexibly to where they are needed. Military mobility requires, for example, the international harmonisation of the rules and procedures concerning cross-border military activities and the development of logistic infrastructure and capabilities to match the requirements for the deployment of troops and their support.

**Military strategic communications** Military strategic communications (MILSTRATCOM) are part of the state leadership's strategic communications. MILSTRATCOM are the coordinated influence activities by the Finnish Defence Forces against the situational awareness of intended target groups to attain military strategic objectives. Military strategic communications are coordinated with NATO's strategic communications.

**Mission vital/critical infrastructure** The framework, services and related functions of the defence system and the critical infrastructure as well as the vital functions of society that are essential enablers of homeland defence at all levels of readiness.

**Multi-domain operations (MDO)** The orchestration of activities across all services and operational domains. The five operational domains of warfare – land, sea, air, cyber and space – are increasingly interrelated. In MDO, military activities are synchronised with non-military activities across all operational domains and environments to create converging effects at the speed of relevance in the physical, cognitive and virtual dimensions. Information defence is implemented in all domains and dimensions.

**National cyber defence** The national and international military and civilian measures that safeguard the sovereignty of Finland and the living conditions of its population against external cyber threats and incidents by state actors and that execute necessary countermeasures at all levels of readiness. A key prerequisite for the preparedness and efficient execution of national cyber defence is close cooperation between public authorities and different actors in society. The Ministry of Defence is responsible for coordinating national cyber defence.

**Operations planning** The planning of military operations at the strategic, operational or tactical levels. In NATO, the term ‘operational planning’ is not to be used so as to prevent confusion with operational-level planning.

**Prepositioning** Storage of defence materiel, equipment or supplies under normal conditions in the territory of another NATO Ally. It speeds up access to materiel, equipment and supplies, enables quick force projection and ensures timely sustainment of forces when the level of readiness is being raised or under emergency conditions.

**Strategic communications** Strategic communications mean open, systematic and proactive communications that aim to attain jointly agreed goals. Strategic communications are always a combination of verbal and visual messages and concrete acts and activities. Strategic communications are above all daily activities, but their importance is highlighted under emergency conditions or in situations with significant and far-reaching effects spanning across administrative boundaries.

**Total defence** Total defence is a combination of all the national and international military and civilian measures to enable homeland defence in all security situations. Finland’s membership in NATO means that total defence support must be extended beyond the Finnish Defence Forces’ troops to Allied forces operating in the territory of Finland. The Ministry of Defence is responsible for coordinating total defence.

*The NATO Glossary, compiled by the Prime Minister’s Office, contains nearly 200 terms. New terms will be added. Read more: [valtioneuvosto.fi](https://valtioneuvosto.fi).*

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